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PREFACE 
Only six of the primary sources discussing Lykourgan 
Sparta are contemporary to that culture. Herein, these 
sources are reviewed and compared both to each other and to 
the history of Sparta as it is understood to modern 
historians, thanks to archeology and other more modern 
sources. In the end, it is hoped that a greater 
appreciation of these figures' opinions may be generated. 
In addition, it is hoped that by comparing the opinions of 
these figures concerning Sparta to their opinions concerning 
the struggle between the aristocratic and democratic 
factions in Athens over control of that city, some 
correlation between the two might be uncovered, explaining 
why each figure expressed the opinions that he did. 
There are several problems that present themselves to 
one making such a review. First of all, few of the figures 
reviewed herein actually wrote histories as such. The 
majority of the sources consist of philosophical tracts, 
plays, and political pamphlets. An objective review of the 
history, merits, and flaws of Sparta was not the motive of 
Plato, nor was it the goal of Aristophanes, and yet it is 
with such figures as these that one is left. As these 
iii 
figures do not write with intent to politicize, sometimes 
their political positions are hidden from the reader's 
examination. 
Furthermore, the status of Sparta and its relationship 
with Athens had an effect upon the Athenian writers 
irregardless of their opinions regarding aristocracy and 
democracy. So, something more complex than a simply 
partisan approach to Sparta's history shall be found. 
Still, party politics shall bee seen to have had some role 
to play in the formation and promulgation of these theories. 
In my studies, I was assisted greatly by my parents, 
Glenn and Charlette Richards, who helped me type and edit 
this thesis, as well as run down the stray source. I would 
like to thank Dr. Neil Hackett for his inspiration and 
encouragementi Dr. Richard Rohrs for his invaluable advice, 
and for pinch-hitting for Dr. Hackett while he was in Japani 
and Dr. Walter Scott for his advice regarding Plato and 
Xenophon, as well as his knowledge of the University's 
technical requirements for this thesis. 
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For many years, Sparta was the most important city in 
Greece, but it left no histories of itself behind for modern 
scholars to study. Of all the things written about Sparta 
during the years between 708 and 371, 1 when the city's 
"classical" institutions still operated, only the writings 
of six authors remain. These writers are Herodotus, 
Thucydides, Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and !socrates. 
The majority of them were Athenians, and all of their works 
come to the modern day through Athens. However, Athens was 
the chief rival of Sparta. As a result, objectivity and 
favor towards Sparta are not things one would expect to find 
in these writings. Nevertheless, some of these writers 
actually seem to prefer Sparta to Athens. 
The opinions and motivations of those who favorably 
compared Sparta to Athens are intriguing, because having and 
stating such opinions might have been considered treason in 
Athens. This would especially have been true during the 
decades of the Pelopennesian Wars, which were fought between 
All dates given will be in the years B. C. unless 
the text states otherwise. 
1 
2 
these two powers. Eventually, Sparta conquered Athens. In 
the aftermath of this defeat, Socrates, a friend to four of 
these writers, was executed. Several of Socrates's old 
students had become a part of Sparta's puppet government 
over Athens after the war. This treason was later 
understood as the result of Socrates's corruptive influence 
over these ex-students. Thus, when Athenian democrats 
returned to power, Socrates became a scapegoat because of 
his pro-Spartan sentiments. Within so passionate a city, 
why did Plato, for example, come to praise the object of so 
much hate? 
One possible answer is that Sparta was seen as an anti-
Athens. It was a symbol of all that Athens was not. This 
contrast might have been an illusion caused by the political 
and military conflicts between these two city-states, but, 
in many cases, the observation seems legitimate. Athens was 
an open, port town; Sparta was a closed, inland town. 
Athens was a democracy; Sparta, an oligarchy. One was a 
naval power, the other a land power. Attic Greeks populated 
Athens, but their Dorian enemies conquered Sparta and used 
it as a base, thereafter. Athens was extroverted, with an 
aggressive foreign policy; Sparta was introverted, and 
feared other cities and cultures. In almost every way these 
two were opposed. As a result, if someone disagreed with 
the ways of Athens, one would naturally look to Sparta as an 
alternative. 
3 
Within Athens, there was a faction well disposed to do 
this. There, the conflict between two social factions 
defined internal politics. 2 One faction supported the 
democratic system dominant in Athens, the other wanted an 
aristocracy to replace it. 3 The presence of such factions 
was common to Greek cities, or poleis, as they were called. 4 
From one perspective, the apocalyptic Peloponnesian War 
might be seen as a metaphor for these political and social 
tensions, with Athens representing the democratic faction, 
and Sparta representing the aristocrats. Until the very end 
of the war, no army ever conquered a city. 5 Instead, the 
presence of a nearby army often prompted the native faction 
that agreed with the army's political alignment to attempt a 
coup within the city. 6 The new regime then invited the army 
into the city, and the army enforced the new regime's form 
of government. 7 
When a polis did take another by force, the first 
thing that the invading army did, whether it was Athenian or 
a Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the 
Athenians, Section 1, Line 3. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Plato, The Republic, Book 4: Segment 422e-423a; 
Book 8: Segment 551d. 
5 Luis A. Losada, The Fifth Column in the 
Pelopennesian War in Mnemosyne Bibliotheco Classica Batava 




Spartan, was to establish a new government of the "proper" 
form there. Athens always forced a democratic government 
upon the citizens of the captured polis.• Sparta always 
established a puppet aristocracy.' 
Thus, it should not be surprising that members of the 
aristocratic faction in Athens looked to Sparta as an 
example to emulate as well as something of a patron. In 
praising Sparta, they were praising aristocracy. They 
were, to some extent, praising themselves. Sparta's 
mysterious nature made for a perfect screen on which these 
Athenians might project their hopes and beliefs. 
This theory might explain why such figures as Plato and 
Socrates seemed to prefer Sparta's ways to those of Athens. 
They praised Sparta as a commentar~ on Athens. What exactly 
did these proponents of Sparta say? 
There are two interlocking themes that run through 
these figures' commentaries. They involve the Spartan 
system of education, known as the agoge, and Sparta's 
political system. Almost universally, commentators admit 
that Sparta's political system and policies were more 
orderly and consistent than those of Athens. 10 Aristocrats 




Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Section 4, Lines 1-3; Section 5, Lines 108-112. 
Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 2: Section 4, Lines 28-
10 Isocrates, On The Peace, Lines 93-95. 
"superiority" over the Athenians' democratic, seemingly 
anarchic, government. Such consistency is often attributed 
to aqoge indoctrination, which taught the future leaders of 
Sparta "virtue," at least as the Spartans defined it. 
While supporters of Sparta often disagreed with the 
exact program used there, or with the specific "virtues" 
towards which the training was directed, the idea of having 
an agoge to generate virtue, instead of leaving the 
indoctrination of children to chance and sophistry, was 
often praised. 1 l Athenian leaders were usually chosen on 
5 
the basis of their popularity, which led policy to change 
with the momentary whims of the people, but Sparta spent 
decades preparing its leadership caste to lead according to 
a fixed set of principles. This was, in the eyes of some, 
an excellent model of the difference between a democracy and 
an aristocracy. In one system, the leadership principle was 
based upon popularity, which led to chaos. In the other, 
leadership was based upon tradition, which led to 
consistency and "virtue." 
This paper intends to answer several questions about 
Sparta, and those who wrote about it. Did praise for Sparta 
and her institutions really follow class lines? How could 
these Athenian writers get away with their praise for 
Sparta? Was Sparta actually as consistent, coherent, and 
"virtuous" as its Athenian supporters said that it was? 
l 1 Ibid; Plato, Republic, Book 8: Segments 562e-563d. 
6 
What role did the agoge have in this supposed order? 
Finally, did Sparta's history justify the aristocrats' faith 
in it, or did the city fail its supporters? To answer these 
questions, one must study the lives and the opinions, of 
each of these six authors to establish their views. Then, 
one must examine the history, institutions, and the 
education system of Sparta to determine where the opinions 
of the Athenians agreed with the those of modern scholars. 
That shall be the order followed in this thesis. 
In the end, class differences between the supporters of 
Athens and the supporters of Sparta seem less clear than one 
might suspect, at least among the writers reviewed here. 
Each author had his own particular agenda in writing his 
work, and this sometimes took precedent over class 
pressures. Furthermore, almost all of the writers 
considered herein grant that there was more internal order 
in Sparta than in Athens, regardless of the author's 
political sympathies. Finally, whenever the agoge is 
discussed, it is seen as the source of Sparta's order. 
level of agreement might be the cause for some of the 
This 
tolerance shown towards the friends of Sparta. Though their 
views were not popular, they were not completely alien to 
Athens. 
It was the attitude of citizens toward the Spartan form 
of order itself that seems to have divided the factions. 
While all value consistency and coherency, the democrats 
7 
seemed to think that the price Sparta paid for them was too 
high. 12 Sparta eventually fell, and its orderly system 
might have hastened its decline. Aristocrats claimed that 
this was a failing of the people of Sparta, 13 or of the 
"virtues" that Sparta promulgated using the agoge. 14 
However, to democrats it was the system itself that was 
suspicious. 
It is on this level that the debate seems to exist. 
This may be another reason that the aristocratic position on 
Sparta was tolerable within Athens. The aristocrats did not 
blindly agree with the Spartans, and certainly did not 
engage in a Peloponnesian War-style coup. Instead, they 
simply drew attention to the popularly-accepted virtues of 
Sparta's aristocratic system, and, admitting Sparta's 
faults, proposed Athenian adaptations and improvements upon 
it. Because of this, the debate was kept on a cerebral 
level that was acceptable in Athens, where free speech was 
usually treasured. 
All in all, one may conclude that Sparta's 
institutions, at least, were usually as stable, and as 
consistent as its reviewers claimed that they were; Sparta's 
1 2 Thucydides, History, Book 2: Section 6, Lines 37-
42. 
13 Xenophon, The Constitution of The Lakedaemonians, 
Section 14, Line 1. 
1 4 Plato, Republic, Book 8: Segments 544a-545a; 
Segments 547c-548c. 
8 
reverence for conformity and tradition was real, but that 
was not enough to save it, as authors who supported Athenian 
democracy pointed out, and as authors who wanted an Athenian 
aristocracy tried to explain away. As stable as these 
institutions were they were sometimes used to propagate 
shifting and unstable policies that would harm the polis. 
These flaws might have caused Sparta to degenerate into a 
corrupt state, and when that happened, the obsession with 
conformity and sublimation that the agoge generated might 
have hastened this corruption. 
The aristocrats might have been just when they observed 
that Sparta knew more kosmos, meaning order, and harmonia, 
meaning inner peace, for a longer time, than did any other 
polis. 15 Were these elements enoug~ to preserve Sparta and 
its culture? No, they were not. 1 e Does this invalidate the 
arguments of those who turned to Sparta as an example of the 
virtues of an aristocracy? 
considered hereafter. 
That question shall be 
15 Isocrates, Peace, Lines 93-95. 




As William Forrest indicated in his book A History of 
Sparta, the world's image of Athens would not significantly 
change, even if we found a million more pot shards and 
another Parthenon, because one knows what the Greeks 
themselves thought about Athens. However, Sparta remains a 
great mystery. It was "seen by way of so many distorting 
mirrors that the modern historian cannot easily arrive at 
the original reflection ... despite the fact that Sparta for 
long was ... the most important state in Greece." 1 Only 
shadows of its history may be discerned. 
It is known that in the early 700s, just as the 
Classical Age was-beginning, Sparta was a great center for 
culture and the arts. Spartan poetry and pottery were 
especially famous. The foreign policy of Sparta was 
blatantly imperialistic. For example, it was probably 
involved in the Lelantine War between Kalkis and Eretria. 2 
Over the course of several military actions and two major 
wars that occurred between 735 and 715, it gained control of 
<London: 
W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta: 950-192 B.C. 
Hutchinson University Library, 1968), 15. 
Forrest, History, 35. 
9 
10 
Lakonia, Messenia, and Amyklai--essentially the entire 
southern Peloponnese. 3 
The results of these wars produced a major change in 
the Spartan character. The classical Greeks traditionally 
took enemy prisoners of war to their homeland to serve as 
slaves. In Sparta, these slaves were called helots. 4 In 
these Spartan wars, however, the number of slaves taken 
exceeded those of any other known conflict. As a result, 
the slave population outnumbered the Spartan population.s 
This would remain the case until 371 when the Thebans 
liberated the helots. 
Fear that the helots would rebel was probably the cause 
of the reforms that occurred soon thereafter. By 676, a 
major restructuring of Spartan society had begun. 0 These 
changes were called the Lykourgan Reforms after the man who 
is responsible for their establishment. 
The truth concerning the legend of Lykourgos, the god-
like Founding Father, will never be known. As Plutarch 
indicated, the true facts have long since been lost, largely 
due to the reticence of the Spartans themselves. 7 In the 
3 J. T. Hooker, The Ancient SI;!artans, <Toronto: J. 
M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1980) , 100-102. 
4 Forrest, History, 31. 
5 Hooker, Ancient, 100-102. 
0 Ibid. , 101. 
1 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 35. 
11 
most general outline, Lykourgos is said to have been the 
regent for one of the Spartan kings. At a time of great 
trouble within the city he traveled abroad to study the 
governments of other cities. Eventually, he went to Delphi 
where Apollo is supposed to have either dictated or given 
approval to the Reforms. Then Lykourgos returned home to 
Sparta to announce the changes. 8 
The political branch of the Reform was the Great 
Rhetra. The Rhetra, or "compact," acted as the Supreme Law 
of the land. With allowances for translation, it said: 
After a sanctuary of Zeus Sullanios and Athena 
Sullania has been established, the people shall be 
divided into tribes and obai 9 , and thirty men, 
including the kings, shall be appointed as a 
Gerousia. The feast of Apollo shall be celebrated 
from time to time between Babyka bridge and the 
river Knakion. At this time, ~uestions shall be 
introduced to the Assembly and withdrawals made. 
To the Assembly of the citizens shall be given 
the final authority. However, if the people 
should speak crookedly, the Gerousia shall set the 
matter aside.1° 
In other words, after seeking the blessings of the gods, the 
citizenry shall be divided into these units, and a Senate of 
thirty members shall be founded, with the kings having a 
permanent seat therein. Regular meetings of the popular 
assembly are assured, and that assembly shall have the power 
B Ibid., Sections 40-41. 
9 Obai: villages. Sparta was never one cosmopolitan 
unit it was a group of neighboring villages living under a 
single government. 
l 0 Plutarch, The Life of Lykourgos, Section 6. 
12 
to pass and retract laws, 11 but the Gerousia shall have some 
sort of veto power over these acts of the Assembly. 12 
According to legend, Lykourgos appointed the first 
Gerousia13 but in historic times a peculiar form of election 
was used to fill a seat amongst the thirty. A hidden panel 
would choose from among the candidates, based upon the 
volume of the applause given to each when he was introduced 
to the Assembly. 14 Membership in the Gerousia was life-
long. The Gerousia seems to have tried the most serious 
criminal cases and set the agenda for the popular Assembly, 
amongst other things. 15 The final provision, which 
indicates that the Assembly had the power to amend 
proposals, but the Gerousia had the right to veto the 
ammendation, 16 was a later addition to the Rhetra. 17 
Some of the offices of Sparta's government remain 
undefined by the Rhetra, because they already existed at the 
time of Lykourgos. For example, Sparta had two 
simultaneously ruling kings. The kings were the leaders of 
1 1 Ibid., Sections 47-48. 
1 2 Forrest, History, 47-48. 
l 3 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 32. 
14 Ibid., Section 26. 
15 Ibid; Xenophon, Constitution, Section 10, Line 2; 
Aristotle, The Politics, Book 2: Chapter 9, Page 25, 
Segment 1271a. 
l 6 Forrest, History, 49-50. 
1 , Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 26, Lines 1-3. 
13 
the Agate and the Eurypontid clans, and were often rivals. 11 
Thus, each prevented the other from becoming too powerful. 
Despite this rivalry, the powers of the kings were 
extensive. Besides having seats within the Gerousia, they 
were also high priests of Zeus, and no religious function 
could occur without the pr~sence of at least one king. 19 As 
a corollary to this, they were the ones who nominated the 
Pythii, or ambassadors to Delphi, where the priestess 
regularly informed Sparta of Apollo's wishes. 20 
When Sparta was at war, one of the kings went onto the 
field, acting as Supreme Commander. 21 However, despite 
their military rank, neither king could declare war, nor 
could they levy the troops. 22 A declaration of war had to 
come from the Assembly. 23 The ephors, who shall be 
discussed later, levied the troops. 24 In a sense, the 
1 8 Ibid., Sections 21-22. 
l ' Herodotus, Historia, Book 6: Lines 56-60. 
ao Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
aa A. H. M. Jones, Sparta <Oxford: Basil Blackwell & 
Matt Ltd. and A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1967), 15. 
23 Thucydides, History, Book 1: Line 87; Xenophon, 
Hellenica, Book 3: Section 2, Line 23; Book 4: Section 6, 
Line 3; Book 6: Section 4, Lines 2-3. 
24 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 3: Section 2, Line 23; 
Line 25; Section 5, Line 6; Book 4: Section 2, Line 9; Book 
5: Section 3, Line 13; Section 4, Line 47; Book 6: 
4, Line 17; Section 5, Line 10. 
Section 
14 
kings' only real political power was the influence that they 
could wield as the heads of Sparta's most prestigious 
families, but this was enough to give such figures as 
Kleomenes the power to shake Sparta's society with their 
designs and eccentricities. As time passed, the power of 
the kings deteriorated, and the ephors took over. 
The ephorate was added to the Spartan government after 
the Rhetra. The ephors were five magistrates who 
administered the Spartan government. Two ephors were 
required to go with a king whenever he left Sparta. 25 
Furthermore, as a corollary to their powers as judges and 
police, each ephor could arrest and imprison one, or both, 
of the kings. 26 It is reasonable to assume that the office 
of the ephor was added to the Spartan system of government 
to curb the executive power of the kings. 27 However, the 
ephors eventually took that power themselves. 28 
By the fifth century, the ephors had incredible powers. 
They could fine citizens, banish foreigners, and kill 
resident aliens for any violation of Spartan law without 
trial or appeal. They could also remove any official, 
including the king, from office. The ephors formulated 
25 Xenophon, 
Hellenica, Book 2: 
Constitution, Section 13, Line 5; 
Section 4, Line 36. 
28 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 8, Line 4; 
Aristotle, Politics, Book 2: Chapter 8, Page 26, Segment 1271a. 
2 7 Hooker, Ancient, 123. 
21 Ibid. 
15 
capital charges against most citizens and the Gerousia tried 
them. The ephors shared with the Gerousia the power to 
propose legislation, but they could not veto amended 
legislation.z• So great were the powers of the ephors that 
no one was allowed to hold the office for more than a 
single, one-year term in his lifetime. 30 The Assembly 
elected these figures. 31 
Every Spartan citizen over the age of twenty-nine was 
allowed a seat in the Assembly, and thus a chance to become 
ephor. 32 However, before a Lakedaemonian could become a 
Spartan citizen, he had to have spent the first twenty years 
of his life participating in the tortuous agoge. The agoge 
was the educational system of Sparta. It was also one of 
the major social reforms Lykourgos instituted.'' 
From birth, the young Spartan was prepared for a 
military life. At birth, the triers, members of an ephor-
appointed committee without any other known function, 
examined them to see if they were physically sound. 34 
at Ibid., 122. 
30 Aristotle, Politics, Book 2: Chapter 9, Page 19; 
Page 23, Segment 1270b. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Hooker, Ancient, 124. 
3 3 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 2, Line 2. 
J 4 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 16. 
16 
Unhealthy infants were thrown over a cliff. 35 If the child 
passed this examination, he received an allotment of land, 
called a kleros, to support his standard of living. 36 This 
kleros could not be sold, though it could be given away. 37 
In many ways, it was the material acknowledgement of a 
Spartan's citizenship. Helots tended each citizen's 
kleros. Thus, all citizens were born with a stake in the 
slave-holding system of helotage. 31 Each of kleros was 
equal in size, if not necessarily in agricultural quality, 
to that of every other citizen. Meanwhile, the Spartan 
owner of the kleros lived in one of the city's many 
outwardly-identical cottages. 39 
Parents were only given temporary custody of their 
children. At the age of seven, chi~dren were given over to 
the state, which selected a teacher, called a paedonomes, to 
prepare them for military training. This began the agoge. 4 o 
The conditions in which the young citizen lived when he 
began his agoge were made to be as difficult as possible, to 
toughen the child. For example, the young Spartan was given 
3 5 Ibid; Jones, Sparta, 34-35. 
3 II Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 16. 
3 7 Aristotle, Politics, Book 2: Chapter 6, Pages 
10-13. 
31 Hooker, Ancient, 118. 
39 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 13, Lines 5-7; Plato, 
Republic, Book 8: Lines 548a-b. 
4 0 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 2, Line 2. 
17 
only one garment to wear per year, for all weather. He was 
allowed no shoes.' 1 His diet was strictly controlled, and 
if he was still hungry, he was encouraged to steal more 
food. Those Spartans who were caught stealing were 
punished--for being caught.' 2 This was supposed to have 
encouraged self-reliance and cunning. Harsh beatings were 
administered for any and all infractions of the rules to 
teach one a strict obedience to one's superiors, and all 
elders had the right to administer this punishment, on the 
spot, and without explanation or justification, if they saw 
such an infraction. 43 
Upon reaching adolescence, added restrictions were 
placed upon the young man to break his spirit. He was 
obliged to walk with his hands in his cloak, and his eyes to 
the ground at all times to teach him modesty. 44 When the 
young Spartan left adolescence, he graduated to a new level 
of learning--actual military training. By this time, he was 
also expected to have at least one homosexual lover, usually 
amongst the older generation. 4 ~ This lover, usually 
procured at the age of twelve, also served as a mentor, 
4 1 Ibid., Section 3. 
4 a Ibid., Section 8. 
4 s Ibid., Sections 11-12. 
44 Ibid., Section 3, Line 4. 
45 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 16, Line 9; Lines 12-
18; Moralia, Lines 237b-c. 
18 
refining the young man's martial skills and introducing him 
to a phratry. 4 • This figure was considered so important 
that sometimes young men were punished for having no lover, 
or for having an wunworthy" lover. 47 
Upon reaching the age of nineteen, the young Spartan 
spent a year in the wilderness of Messenia surviving without 
outside aid, and competing with his fellows to kill the 
greatest number of free Messenians. This ritual, called the 
krypteia, represented his "final examination." 41 When it 
was over, a sussutia, which combined the functions of a 
barracks and a mess hall judged the young man. If he was 
acceptable to all members of that sussutia, he joined it, 
lived there, fought with its members, and was acknowledged 
as a full citizen. 49 
The life of the adult Spartan was as regimented as that 
of the youth. At the age of thirty, he could vote in the 
Assembly. 50 The citizen retired from active military 
service in his fifties, and at sixty he might run for a seat 
46 Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: 
Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution <Tulsa: 
The University of Tulsa Press, 1988), 115. 
4 7 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 18, Lines 8-9. 
41 Plato, Laws, Book 1: Segments 633b-c; Plutarch, 
Lykourgos, Section 28, Lines 2-4; The Life of Kleomenes, 
Section 28, Lines 2-4. 
4 9 Hooker, Ancient, 134. 
so Ibid., 124. 
19 
in the Gerousia, should one be open. 51 In the interim, he 
was obliged to be wed, and expected to have many children to 
swell the armies of the next generation. 52 
When a Spartan died, his land and his wife, if she was 
of child-bearing age, would be assigned to another Spartan 
by one of the kings. 53 Very strict sumptuary laws combated 
economic imbalance and soft-living amongst the Spartans, but 
sometimes this was not enough, so the royal assignments of 
wives and their inheritance from previous husbands were used 
to further insure economic equality. 54 
Under the Lykourgan Reforms everything in a Spartan's 
life was subordinated to the goal of producing the perfect 
military machine. Each citizen was raised to become an 
ideal soldier, who would do his duty without the 
distractions of individuality to leaven his obedience. 55 
Even the most important personal relationships were reduced 
to secondary importance. For example, marriage customs of 
some sort were necessary to provide the city with new 
soldiers, and, at the same time, maintain clear paternal 
links for the sake of inheritance, but the emotive content 
5 1 Plutarch, Lykourgos, Section 26. 
5 2 Aristotle, Politics, Book 2: Chapter 6, Section 13. 
53 Hooker, Ancient, 134. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Aristotle, Politics, Book 7: Chapter 2, Page 9, 
Segment 1324a; Sections 19b-34a. 
of this relationship was consciously minimized. In its 
place, a homosexual relationship was institutionalized so 
that a soldier's primary emotional bond was to another 
soldier. 56 
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Effectively, the garrison raised the Spartan. When the 
Spartan became an adult, he was married to the garrison, 
gave his children to the garrison, and was encouraged to 
treat all of the garrison's children as his own. He had no 
real existence separate from that of the garrison. This was 
the product of the agoge. No other form of education was 
allowed in Sparta. 57 Very ~trict transportation laws also 
regulated access to the city in an attempt to regulate the 
ideas to which both citizens and non-citizens were 
exposed. 51 Through strict control of education, Sparta 
controlled its people, or at least it tried to do so. 
Spartan citizens called themselves Homoioi, meaning 
"Equals." 5 ' The use of this term has great significance in 
one's understanding of Sparta and its social system. For 
one thing, this term made it fairly obvious to the non-
homoioi that he was not considered equal to the nobility. 
This idea of equality within the class of nobles was the 
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stressed the need for Spartans to stand together as equals, 
instead of fighting each other for pre-eminence within the 
class. The term homoioi can also mean "similar," and is the 
basis for the modern word "homogenous." That too describes 
the Spartan ideal. If someone was not exactly the same as 
the other homoioi there was something wrong with him. 
As a result of this sort of pressure, this culture, 
fairly obviously, raised peer pressure to an incredible 
height of power. All that a man was or did existed only in 
terms of his community and when he deviated from the 
dictates of this community, it punished him no matter what 
the cause. !socrates tells his readers that "the Spartans 
think nothing is as capable of inspiring terror as the 
prospect of being reproached by their fellow citizens." 60 
Take, for example, the story of Orthrydes, who survived 
the Battle of Thyreae. The general opinion of the Spartans 
was that being the only survivor of his army was somehow 
shameful, despite the fact that it was upon his survival 
that they based their claim to have won the battle. Their 
disappointment was made known to him through a campaign of 
social snubs. He quickly chose to kill himself in obedience 
to the city's decree. 61 
Every major force that went into defining the life of 
the polis citizen was accounted for in the Lykourgan Code. 
6 0 !socrates, Archidamus, Line 59. 
6 1 Herodotus, Historia, Book 1: Line 83. 
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They were all either redirected toward the goal of creating 
the perfect hoplite state or were eliminated. It was when 
this code was instituted that the history of classical 
Sparta truly began. 
The exact date when the Reforms turned Sparta into the 
militaristic polis known to the ancients remains a mystery. 
However, several events are still remembered from that era. 
They supply one with a general appreciation of the 
challenges Sparta faced, at that time. 
Sparta fought many wars of conquest in the first 
centuries of the Classical age, but until 550, Sparta's 
worst enemies had been its own policies. Until that time, 
Sparta dealt with internal enemies by means of repression, 
and external enemies by means of conquest. If a nearby 
polis looked like it would try to ally itself with the 
helots and the free Messenians to conquer Sparta, then the 
Spartans conquered it. If the Spartans won, even more 
helots were captured. This made the situation at home even 
more unstable. The new territorial gains also made Sparta 
more of a target to foreign foes, who feared Sparta's 
growing power. 62 
rebel. 
If the Spartans lost, the helots would 
In response to this problem, when Sparta conquered 
Tegea in 550, it did not carry its citizens off to become 
helots. Instead it forced a treaty of alliance of the 
6 2 Forrest, History, 73. 
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Tegeans. The treaties with Tegea and, later, Lydia, marked 
the beginning of a new foreign policy for Sparta. Alliances 
of these sorts became Sparta's answer to her exterior foes. 
As no one had the power to face all three of these poleis, 
Sparta's power and safety was assured. After a century of 
increasing instability and hardship, Sparta was, once again, 
a force to be respected. 63 
When the friendship between Argos and Arkadia ended, 
Sparta was left with an opening to split Messenia's 
remaining allies permanently by forming an alliance with the 
Arkadians, just as it had with Lyssa. The Delphic Oracle 
confirmed that this was Apollo's desire as well. One of the 
kings named his son Philocharas, "Friend of the Arkadians," 
and the alliance was finalized in 540. 64 
The formal unification of all of these alliances into 
the Peloponnesian League in 505 made Sparta, the league's 
leader, into a major power in the Mediterranean. Due to 
Sparta's broadening interests, it came into contact with 
many of the powers and problems that would come to define 
its later history. For example, it was at this time that 
trouble with the Persian Empire began. 
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and several of its emperors evidently tried to reverse its 
decline by conquering new lands. Greece and the islands on 
its periphery became the targets for this expansion. 
Requests for aid against the Persians came to Sparta more 
and more often, but the Spartans did not feel capable of 
successfully confronting this giant, and the requests were 
rejected on all occasions. 65 Still, some sort of 
confrontation between these powers was inevitable as Sparta 
grew in prominence. 
The single most colorful figure of this era of Sparta's 
expansion was Kleomenes. The peculiarity of Kleornenes's 
life was evident from the beginning. His father had two 
wives simultaneously, one to solidify a treaty with 
Arkadia. 66 This produced an immediate quarrel over the 
royal succession. As the firstborn and the child of the 
Spartan wife, Kleomenes won the conflict. 67 Dorieus, 
Kleomenes' half-brother left to start the North African 
apoikia, or colony, of Kynpis in 512. 68 
Carthage wiped out Kynpis in 510. 69 Dorieus tried to 
begin a second apoikia in Italy, but the natives also 
65 Ibid., 81. 
6 6 Herodotus, Historia, Book 5: Lines 39-41. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. The life of Dorieus is related in: 
Herodotus, Historia Book 5: Lines 39-48. 
69 Herodotus, Historia, Book 5, Line 44. 
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destroyed this colony, and Dorieus died in this battle. 70 
Kleomenes refused to send help to his half-brother when the 
hostilities began, and beat to death the messenger who asked 
for aid. 71 
Kleomenes's next adventure involved a strategy that 
Sparta had developed for expanding its power in this later 
era without committing its entire army to further military 
adventures. It backed coups that ousted local tyrants who 
had taken over other poleis. When the new government was in 
place, it joined the Peloponnesian League. The treaties by 
which they did so always contained provisions that the new 
member would "follow Sparta's lead" in all matters. 7 a The 
League was becoming an empire. 
Athens was one of the cities that Sparta "liberated" 
during this time. For some time, the descendants of 
Peisistratos, who were allied with the government of Argos, 
controlled Athens. The Alkmeonids, who were allies of 
Sparta, had been banished to Delphi by their enemies the 
Peisistratids. From there they invited the Lakedaemonians 
to end the tyranny of the Peisistratids. After a failed 
naval expedition in 514, the Spartans launched their first 
land invasion of Attika in 510. The Peisistratids fled to 
7 0 Ibid., Line 46. 
7 1 Forrest, History, 86. 
72 Ibid., 88. Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 2: Section 
2, Line 20. 
Persia, where one of their number became a satrap, or 
"Governor" of one of the Emperor's outlying provinces. 
Kleomenes commanded the victorious army. 73 
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Whatever the settlement that occurred between the 
cities at this time was, it was apparently not acceptable to 
Kleomenes, because in 508 he returned to expel seven hundred 
Athenian families from Attika and re-write the Athenian 
constitution. 74 The Athenians refused to accept this 
behavior, and besieged the king and all of his allies in the 
Akropolis. When the siege was over, all Athenians who aided 
the king were killed, while the Spartans were forced out of 
Attika. 75 
Kleomenes raised an army for a second invasion of 
Attika, but Korinth refused to help him in this effort. 76 
The result was a great deal of tension and discord within 
the League. 
Eleusis. 77 
Then, Athens defeated Kleomenes's army at 
Kleomenes persuaded the Boeotians to attempt such an 
expedition, but they failed to conquer Attika, which 
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agreed to back Hippias, the Peisistratid, in his attempt to 
take Athens back under his control. However, he was unable 
to garner enough support for this action either in the 
Assembly or in the League, so this effort failed also. 79 
Kleomenes tried to recoup his prestige in 494 by 
conquering Argos. However, due to the strains he had placed 
upon the League, he went outside of the League to Boeotia, 
Aigina, Delphi, and Thessaly for allies in this venture. 10 
This might have further insulted the League. He broke 
Argos's power for a generation, but he did not take the city 
itself. Instead, he burnt down the sacred forest of Argos, 
and, as a result, was denounced throughout Greece as a 
heretic. 11 Some claimed that he went mad as a result of 
this sacrilege. 12 The Spartans, who believed that all evil 
began outside of their home, claimed that Kleomenes picked 
up the foreign habit of drinking wine undiluted by water, 
and went mad as a result of that addiction. 83 
When Kleomenes's co-ruler died, he arranged for Delphi 
to discredit the direct heir to the empty throne in favor of 
his ally, Leotykidas II. 84 This was to be his last victory 
7' Forrest, History, 89. 
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• 1 Hooker, Ancient, 154 . 
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and it was not an enduring one. The king's forgery of 
Delphi's edict in favor of Leotykidas was eventually 
discovered, and Kleomenes was forced to flee the Peloponnese 
to escape the wrath of his vengeful countrymen. 15 While 
abroad, he helped Sparta's old rivals, the Arkadians, form 
an anti-Spartan Arkadian League, and incited violence 
against Sparta. 16 Kleomenes evidently hoped that this 
alliance would protect him from his enemies, and provide him 
with a vehicle by which he could gain even more power over 
Greece. This did not happen, but the Arkadian League 
continued to exist after his death, much to Sparta's 
consternation and chagrin. 17 
Eventually, Kleomenes returned to Sparta. The 
circumstances by which he returned are unknown. After his 
return, he had a nervous breakdown. He went about striking 
random citizens on their heads and shoulders in the fashion 
by which Sparta's children were punished during their 
agoge.•• He was captured and put in chains. In 490, he 
died of slow self-mutilation. 89 
The Greece that Kleomenes left had a new power, 
ss Ibid., Section 119. 
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Athens. 90 Furthermore, Athens hated Sparta, thanks to 
Kleomenes. His actions also alienated Korinth, Arkadia, and 
other members of the Peloponnesian League. 91 The internal 
confusion and conflict Kleomenes caused within Sparta, was 
so great that the polis was unable to field an army at 
Marathon when the Persians made their first attempt to 
conquer Greece in 490. 92 Instead, Athens single-handedly 
saved Greece, solidifying its reputation at Sparta's 
expense.'' Sparta, bearing this heritage, would be forced 
to face an even greater Persian invasion in just ten years. 
Sparta was technically the leader of the forces 
defending Greece during the Persian War that began in 480, 
but Athens, the only defender who was not a member of the 
Peloponnesian League, was the real power of the campaign. 
At Salamis, it cut the invading army off from its home base 
and destroyed its navy. Later it would cripple the Persian 
army, effectively ending the conflict. Sparta's great 
contribution to the fighting consisted of one battle, where 
its army was devastated while turning the invader's advance 
into the Peloponnese. After the war, Athens founded its own 
league, as a rival to the Peloponnesian League, using its 
, 0 Forrest, History, 92. 
, 1 Ibid., 92-93. 
92 Hooker, Ancient, 158; Herodotus, Historia, Book 5: 
Line 106. 
93 Ibid. 
newly-won fame as its cornerstone. 
The history of the Athenian League is one of gradual 
corruption, and of the exploitation of Athens's allies, 
fueled by ambition and a desire for power. 94 The growing 
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fear that Sparta held for this new power punctuated this era 
of its history. Actually, these two poleis rarely came into 
direct conflict at this time, but when Athens's growing 
empire abutted the territories of other members of the 
Peloponnesian League, those members turned to Sparta for 
help.'' 
Initially, Sparta refused to assist or protect its 
allies, as it was still reluctant to engage in long-term 
military ventures for fear that the helots might take 
advantage of this opportunity to throw off their slavery. 96 
As if to punctuate this fear, an earthquake in 646 prompted 
the best documented of the helot uprisings.'' Sparta's 
refusal to aid them angered the other members of the League, 
endangering it. This further weakened Sparta's defense 
posture, while its old enemy, Argos, rebuilt its power with 
the help of their Athenian allies. 91 
Eventually, the unceasing pressure of Sparta's allies 
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yielded a series of Spartan demands against Athens.'' 
Athens rejected these demands, stating that it preferred 
leaving the matter of their differences in the hands of a 
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neutral arbiter. 1 oo Sparta responded with a declaration of 
war.lD1 
Sparta's basic strategy, at this time, was defined more 
by its desire to maintain internal security during the war 
than it was by the desire to make a continuing effort to 
wipe out their enemies. The Spartans' hope was to end 
matters with a quick thrust against Athens during a time of 
relative peace and security within their own borders. 102 
Unfortunately, the various land campaigns yielded no result. 
In the meantime, the Athenian Navy captured the ports 
of Gytheion, Megara, Achaia, Troize~, and Aigina. 101 
Pressure from the lower classes of Sparta, as well as from 
Sparta's allies, obliged the king to sign a thirty-year 
peace treaty with Athens. 104 Athens gave up some of the 
captured ports, but it won an acknowledgement of its 
'' Hooker, Ancient, 179-181. 
100 Ibid. 
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hegemony over Attika. 105 Sparta would not forget the scars 
of this loss, which foolish leadership and internal discord 
had caused. 
In 431, Sparta broke the treaty. 106 Officially, Sparta 
fought this war in response to Athens's attempt to return 
the straying polis of Plataia to its league. 107 At the same 
time, Sparta claimed that it would "liberate Greece from the 
tyranny of Athens." 108 
The strategy used by Sparta in this phase of the 
Peloponnesian War was more logical than that used in the 
first phase. This strategy was, however, just as effective 
as its predecessor. Between 432 and 421, Sparta tried to 
wear down its opponent by encouraging Athens's allies to 
defect, while also striving to cut it off from its food 
supply. 10 ' Argos was technically neutral until 420, due to 
a separate peace treaty between it and Sparta. 110 It would 
be watched, and with luck the war would be over before it 
became involved. 1 ll Unfortunately, the end result of this 
1 0 5 Forrest, History, 107. 
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policy was yet another series of stalemates, with the 
Spartan armies causing a great deal of destruction in 
Attika, and the Athenians supplying themselves and their 
allies from the sea. 112 
In 420, as the possibility of Argos joining the war 
approached, Sparta was no closer to victory than it had been 
before, a major plague in Athens notwithstanding. Both 
sides were simply exhausting themselves with no result. 113 
So, despite the fact that Greece had not been "liberated" to 
any extent, a second treaty was signed, ending this second 
phase of the war. 11 • 
In the years between 421 and 415, Sparta concentrated 
on shoring up its League and securing the Peloponnese. In 
418, at the Battle of Mantinea, Sparta finally defeated its 
old enemy, Argos, despite the fact that Argos was receiving 
covert support from Athens. 115 A year later, as Thucydides 
said, "the Spartans settled affairs in Achaia which had not 
been previously to their taste." 116 Lesser battles dealt 
with straying allies such as Elis. 117 A treaty of alliance 
11z Hooker, Ancient, 188. 
1 l 3 Ibid., 198; Forrest, History, 113-114. 
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between Athens and Sparta was signed, making it look like 
they were settling their differences. 111 
In 415, Athens attacked the Korinthian colony of 
Syracuse, seeking access to the riches of Sicily. 119 An 
Athenian traitor named Alkibiades advised Sparta to 
retaliate. 120 Instead, Sparta waited until Athens raided 
Lakedaemonia, itself, before it resorted to violence. 121 
The war had begun again. In 413, the Athenian Navy was 
destroyed off the coast of Sicily. 122 By 412, Athens began 
to lose its allies. 123 Though the claim that Sparta was 
liberating Greece was no longer a part of the city's 
official propaganda, Athens's behavior had alienated almost 
everyone. 124 
Still, Athens kept some allies and built a small new 
navy. It would be 404 before its internal squabbling, 
combined with its weakened state, gave Sparta its final 
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victory. 125 Athens lost its walls, most of its navy, and 
its democracy. Several of its leaders went into exile. A 
garrison was established to observe things in Athens. 126 
Rather than destroy the city as the Korinthians had 
suggested, Sparta tried to establish a puppet oligarchy over 
Athens, called the Thirty, 127 and then sat back to enjoy its 
hard-won hegemony over all Greece. 121 
It had been prophesied that love of wealth would be 
Sparta's undoing, 129 and after 404 there was a great deal of 
wealth in Sparta. The Lakedaemonians' constant desire to 
expand their power abroad indicated that greed had always 
been present, but occasional military defeats provided the 
Spartans with an appreciation of their limits. However, 
after 404 their ambition to expand knew no limit. Between 
the years 404 and 371, Sparta only knew one year of 
peace. 130 The rest of the time it was either dealing with 
internal violence, re-enforcing its will upon Greece, or 
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engaging in military adventures against Persia. 131 
The first effort by someone other than the helots to 
wield power over the policies of Sparta, over the heads of 
the homoioi, resulted in the Thirty Year Peace Treaty that 
ended the Korinthian War. 13 a That uprising should have 
warned the homoioi of troubles to come. In 398, members of 
the lower classes of Sparta worked together to take over the 
city in a coup against the homoioi; 133 the coup failed. 134 
Still, this was the first time that someone other than the 
helots threatened Sparta's internal kosmos. 
Meanwhile, other poleis both within and without the 
Peloponnesian League began to prepare for a confrontation 
with Sparta. Athens quickly restored its democracy, and 
rebuilt its defensive walls. 135 This was in direct 
contradiction to the treaty with Sparta. Korinth forged a 
new alliance with Argos. 136 Sparta invaded the Thebans in 
131 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 3: Section 2, Lines 21-
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383, and the Thebans formed an army against its one-time 
ally.137 Finally, Athens established a second league called 
the Athenian Confederacy in 377. 131 
Eventually, two major campaigns ended in total defeat 
for Sparta. In 373, the entire Spartan Navy was 
destroyed, 13 ' and in 371, at Leuktra, the Thebans destroyed 
the invading Spartan Army in a hoplite to hoplite battle. 140 
The Thebans then moved on to capture Sparta itself and 
Sparta's power was broken forever. 141 
A Theban-led Arkadian League replaced the Peloponnesian 
League, which had disintegrated with Sparta's loss. 142 
Messenia was liberated, and the helots returned to found 
their own state with Theban help. 143 Thebes, however, did 
not go so far as to establish an empire itself. It 
concentrated on maintaining its internal order, and so, no 
power took Sparta's place as lord of Greece until Philip of 
Macedonia conquered it. 144 The Classical Age had ended. 
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CHAPTER III 
HERODOTUS 
The earliest extant work of history to discuss 
classical Sparta in any depth is the Historia by Herodotus 
of Halicarnassus. Little is known about the life of 
Herodotus. He was born sometime around the year 484. In 
the Historia, he claims to have traveled extensively in the 
eastern Mediterranean, where he heard many of the stories 
that are related in his book. 1 It is believed that he 
eventually settled in Samoa. 
According to the Alexandrian historian Suidas, 
Herodotus's voyages were not altogether voluntary. 
Lygdamis, an ally of Persia, ruled Halicarnassus. By the 
year 464, several pro-Athenian families, including 
Herodotus's own, had tried to take over the government. The 
coup failed, and the families were banished. At least one 
of the historian's relatives was killed. A second attempted 
coup, occurring several years later, was successful, and, as 
a result, Halicarnassus became a part of the Athenian 
Empire. Herodotus returned to Halicarnassus for a short 
1 Herodotus, Historia, Book 1: Line 194; Book 2: 
Line 49; Line 150; Book 4: Lines 18-117. 
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time, but he did not remain there.a 
Herodotus spent his final years in Thuria, an Italian 
colony of Athens's. He might have gone to Athens on 
occasion, because legend has it that he once won ten gold 
talents there for a reading of his history. 3 He seems to 
have lived to see the first years of the Peloponnesian War, 
dying in 425. 
Given this short biography, it might be justly assumed 
that Herodotus would take the Athenian/democratic side of 
things when he discusses history, and, indeed, he does. At 
one point, he attributes Athens's victories to her 
democratic institutions, and his story of at least one major 
battle is based more upon Athenian propaganda than upon the 
facts, as archeological studies of the battle site have 
proven. 4 However, Herodotus does try to be objective, and 
he often transcribes each side's version of a contested 
event. 
Despite the fact that his lifetime witnessed a gradual 
buildup in hostilities between Athens and Sparta, there is 
little anti-Spartan rhetoric in the Historia. Herodotus 
admittedly attacks individual Spartans, such as Kleomenes, 
but his general attitude towards Sparta itself seems to be 
a A. R. Burn, 
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favorable. This attitude is, in part, a function of the 
author's general goals. He intends to relate in his 
Historia the battle of the noble Greeks against the Persian 
invaders. Sparta fought against Persia; thus, Sparta is a 
protagonist in these writings. 
The character of Sparta and its institutions is implied 
in a manner typical for Herodotus. In the Historia, 
individual characters often seem more like "voices," 
representing one aspect of a national or local character, 
than they do people. They each act as a tool by which the 
author may express some truth about the people, or the 
situations, being discussed. Sparta is represented by three 
such figures: Leonidas, a king; Pausanias, a regent; and 
Demaratus, a Spartan who defected to Persia. So it is to 
these three characters that one must look to discover what 
Herodotus thought about Sparta. 
Leonidas was one of the kings of Sparta. Sparta was a 
dyarchy, and had two kings serving at all times. Leonidas 
portrays the Spartan ideal in the Historia. There he is 
depicted as saying little, and what little he does say has 
the feel of being proverbs that he learned by rote. To him, 
the greatest of crimes are cowardice and disloyalty. He is 
inflexibly disciplined and invincible in battle. The 
primary forces defining his life are an unshakable religious 
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scruple and unalloyed, unconditional patriotism. 5 When the 
Delphic priestess indicates that Sparta would have to lose a 
king if the Persian invaders are to be defeated, he allows 
himself to be killed in battle.& At least that is what 
Herodotus says. When Leonidas dies, it is with honor, at 
the Battle of Thermopylae. 7 
Pausanias is depicted as being noble, and even heroic 
at first, while he remains in Sparta. However, when he is 
outside of Sparta he comes into contact with the material 
wealth of decadent Persia and is fascinated even as it 
disgusts him.• When he is exposed to the luxuries of Persia 
while acting as Lord of Byzantium, desire for wealth 
corrupts him. Eventually, he turns against his city for his 
own personal gain. He even goes so far as to wear Persian-
style clothing. Eventually, the Asiatic Greeks become so 
disgusted with this behavior that they replace Sparta with 
Athens as head of their alliance against Persia just to be 
rid of the Spartan leader.' The reputation of Spartans in 
general is tarnished. 
Eventually, Pausanias began to negotiate with Xerxes to 
5 The story of Leonidas is related in: Herodotus, 
Historia, Book 5: Line 42; Book 7: Lines 203-209; Book 7: 
Lines 220-227. 
6 Ibid., Book 7: Line 220. 
7 Ibid., Line 227. 
B Ibid., Book 9: Line 83. 
' Ibid., Book 8: Line 2. 
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conquer all of Greece in the Emperor's name. In return, the 
Spartan would receive satrapy over the conquered 
territories. When news of this negotiation reached Greece, 
the Spartans tried Pausanias for treason, but was acquitted 
for lack of evidence. Then he seized a Spartan ship and 
sailed back to Byzantium illegally to recommence 
negotiations with the Emperor. Pausanias was immediately 
summoned back to Sparta, and a second trial was held. When 
it became obvious that this time he will be found guilty, he 
fled to the temple of Athena. Eventually, he was starved 
out of his sanctuary. Just as Pausanias acts as a king 
without really being a king, he acts the part of a Spartan 
without actually being loyal to the Spartan way. 10 
Demaratus, another king of Sparta, straddles the 
perfection of Leonidas and the corruption of Pausanias. He 
is generally depicted as a noble, even heroic, individual. 
The story of his conception is made to mirror that of 
Heracles, the legendary father of the Dorians, which implies 
that Demaratus is something of a demi-god himself. 11 Yet he 
fights for the Persians against Sparta and takes great joy 
in informing Sparta of its defeats. 12 This is because the 
Spartans unjustly depose him, due to the machinations of his 
10 The story of Pausanias is related in: Herodotus, 
Historia, Book 4: Line 8; Book 5: Line 34; Book 8: Line 
103; Book 9: Lin9 11; Lines 15-16; Line 29; Lines 45-88. 
l l Ibid., Book 6: Lines 68-69. 
1 2 Ibid., Book 7: Line 239. 
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enemies: Kleomenes, a favorite whipping-post of 
Herodotus's, and Leotychides, who replaced Demaratus upon 
the throne. 13 The Persians give Demaratus sanctuary and so 
he serves their emperor, Xerxes, loyally. 14 
As the only Greek amongst the Persian generals who form 
Xerxes's inner circle, Demaratus acts as Xerxes's guide in 
Greece, discussini the strengths and weaknesses of the 
various poleis. He naturally has quite a lot to say about 
his old home. In fact, given the fact that none of the 
other characters in the Historia speak so often, and so 
directly about Sparta, he might even be a mouth-piece for 
Herodotus through whom the historian's own opinions might be 
expressed. 
In the words of Demaratus, Sparta is "the finest 
kingdom in Greece, and with the bravest men." 15 This is 
because "they have a master, and that master is Law, which 
they fear much more than your subjects fear you." 16 This 
Spartan Law binds them to Spartan "virtues," commanding them 
"never to retreat in battle, however great the odds, but 
always to stand firm, and to conquer or die." 17 This Law 
also stresses the need for communal action. "(FJighting 
l 3 Ibid. I Book 6: Lines 64-67. 
l 4 Ibid. I Line 74. 
1 5 Ibid. I Book 7: Line 210. 
1 6 I bid. I Line 107. 
1 7 Ibid. 
singly, they are as good as any," he says, "but fighting 
together they are the best soldiers in the world .... 
[TJhey will not under any circumstances accept terms from 
you which would mean slavery for Greece .... [TJhey will 
fight you even if the rest of Greece submits." 18 They 
could, he implied, defeat a force ten times as powerful. 19 
Xerxes pays ~o heed to what Demaratus says, but later 
he learns that the Spartan was right. All of Demaratus's 
predictions concerning the result of Xerxes's invasion of 
Greece are fulfilled. This seems to vindicate them. 
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The difference between Leonidas and Pausanias seems to 
have been centered around Pausanias's reaction to Persian 
wealth. 20 Sparta's character always held a fatal 
vulnerability to greed. Furthermore, people seem to have 
known of that flaw for some time before the Peloponnesian 
War yielded proof of this observation. 21 Despite this fact, 
however, Sparta is not described as being corrupt, a 
breeding ground for vice. In the Historia, it is "the 
finest kingdom in Greece." 22 
Why would such a status have been given to a people 
noted for their vulnerability to corruption? Are not the 
1s Ibid., Line 103. 
1 ' Ibid. 
2 0 Forrest, History, 127. 
21 Ibid. 
a a Herodotus, Book 7: Line 209. 
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two images contradictory? Perhaps they may be reconciled. 
In Sparta the children were taught to steal, fearing 
only failure, and to compete with their fellows for 
everything. 23 However, this ruthlessness, which is so 
necessary in war, may destroy a city by causing one to see 
one's fellow citizens only as rivals or as victims. The 
Spartans compensated for this by also teaching their 
children to fear public disgrace above all else, even 
death. 24 However, this apparent contradiction between 
being encouraged towards both ruthlessness and public 
spiritedness produced a "shame culture," where such 
disciplines are not internalized. 
Nevertheless, Leonidas evidently had the strength of 
character to internalize his agoqe-generated loyalty to 
Sparta while Pausanias did not. As a result, the king could 
leave Sparta geographically without leaving it 
psychologically, while the regent could not. The agoge 
taught Leonidas to be virtuous. On the other hand, it 
merely disciplined and regulated Pausanias. When the 
discipline was removed all of Pausanias's repressed 
appetites took control, and once loosened they could not be 
reigned in again. 
and savages. 
The same system can create both saints 
The story of Demaratus underscores this idea. Sparta 
:1. 3 
z 4 
Xenophon, Constitution, Section 2, Lines 6-7. 
!socrates, Archidamus, Line 59. 
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may teach its citizens "virtue" as the Spartans defined the 
term--military effectiveness and cohesiveness. In such 
matters, they might have been the best in the world. 
However, it takes more than this to run a country. The 
corrupt machinations of Kleomenes and Leotychides disrupted 
the workings of the polis, and robbed it of a noble leader 
when it needed one.zs However coherent, orderly, and 
"virtuous" these men were in battle, they, like Pausanias, 
did not have virtue in the modern sense, and, as a result, 
they disrupted Sparta on a political level that eventually 
affected the military affairs of the state. In assuring the 
military superiority of their state by means of Law, the 
Spartans may have sacrificed moral excellence. Perhaps they 
were overspecialized, and were especially open to non-
military failures as a result. 
Another side to the order of Sparta that is revealed in 
the story of Demaratus involves the unanimity with which the 
Spartans rejected him when he was deposed. Accustomed to 
acting as a unit, the Spartans apparently did not question 
their leaders when Kleomenes and Leotychides told them to 
get rid of Demaratus. 26 They just obeyed, like good 
soldiers. Sparta may have been orderly and its people 
loyal, but, as there was no science of ends in their study 
of the military, no questioning of what Sparta should fight 
Herodotus, Book 6: Lines 64-67. 
26 Ibid. 
for, the people simply did what their leaders told them to 
do, for good or ill. 
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So, the three representatives of Sparta speak well of 
its ability to create and preserve a crack military that can 
defeat any army in the world. This indicates that the 
Spartan ideal of virtue was achieved. This ideal involves 
the idea of Spartans cohering together as a single unit, 
and acting together to protect their city from all dangers. 
This part of the ideal seems to have been fulfilled as well, 
at least in regard to military operations. As a result of 
these successes, Sparta was able to produce such heroes as 
Leonidas, but Herodotus seems to find a dark side to 
Sparta's military virtue. 
Sparta's stress on unity made her people dependent upon 
their community for moral guidance and support. It also 
made them vulnerable to manipulation by their leaders. 
Though these leaders were fully trained by the Spartan agoge 
in the customs and traditions of Sparta, they were not 
immune to corruption. Foreign ideas would contaminate some 
when they went abroad, because the shame-based agoge 
morality left them with low resistances to foreign ideas 
when strangers surrounded them. Others simply did not apply 
the strict standard of military kosmos to political matters, 
and thereby disrupted the polis in affairs that did not 
directly affect the military. It is, perhaps, significant 
that Herodotus never depicted the Spartan paragon, Leonidas, 
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operating away from fellow Spartans. Instead, Leonidas was 
always seen leading military operations. Perhaps, like 
Sparta, his excellence faded when he left the strict 
confines of army life in Sparta. Herodotus praised Sparta, 
but his praise, like Sparta's virtue, seems to have been 
conditional. 
In a sense, Herodotus has just the opposite problem. 
Like Plato, he provides good analysis of several aspects of 
Sparta's culture, but only by sacrificing an objective 
discussion of all the facts. His history does not simply 
list the facts of Greek history and draw them together with 
analysis and interpretation. Herodotus provides a series of 
interspaced anecdotes that invites analysis from the reader. 
The historian might favor one particular interpretation, but 
he rarely describes this theory directly, supposedly leaving 
the reader free to make his own opinion. 
This is both a strength and a weakness. Herodotus 
inspires thought, but he only provides the facts that fit 
into his little stories. Who knows what one may learn from 
having another perspective on the events discussed? Who 
knows what facts might have been suppressed to guide the 
reader to one particular interpretation of the facts? 
Herodotus does not help the critical reader to separate the 
facts from the theories in his text as does Xenophon. 
Herodotus, though a historian, falls somewhere between 
these two general classes. He gives a great number of 
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facts, but sometimes one cannot separate facts from 
interpretations. Herodotus was the first great historian, 
and as such his methods might reasonably be assumed to be 
more primitive than his successors. Perhaps that is why his 
interpretation is harder to separate from his history. 
Ironically, that part of Herodotus's interpretations, 
which the reader may extract, comes closer to resembling the 
conclusions that have been derived concerning Sparta's fall 
than does any of the other professionals. Perhaps this is 
because he wrote before the Peloponnesian War skewed 
Athenian perceptions of Sparta, or perhaps he was simply 
more insightful than either Thucydides or Xenophon. Maybe 
Herodotus simply left so many possible interpretations open 
to the readers, in the hopes that each one might reach his 
own conclusion about the events described in his anecdotes; 
someone with fore-knowledge of Sparta's history can always 
find evidence for the interpretation that his knowledge 
already suggests in the story provided. Whatever the 
reason, while one is never certain of the truth of the 
stories reported by this figure, the conclusions that he 
draws from these tales ring true throughout one's studies of 
all the other sources. 
CHAPTER IV 
THUCYDIDES 
Thucydides was a younger contemporary of Herodotus. He 
was born sometime around the year 460, in Athens, to a 
prominent family. Pericles, who would become the great 
protagonist of The History of the Peloponnesian War was a 
cousin. Through his father, Olorus, Thucydides was a~so 
related to Kimon, son of Miltides, Prince of Thrace. As a 
result, Thucydides also had a Thracian estate. His 
connections with Thrace would be of great significance to 
him in the future. This historian also owned a gold mine 
near Thasos that made him independently wealthy. 1 
According to ancient biographers, Thucydides was a 
student of the philosopher Anaxagoras, and of the great 
orator Antiphon the Oligarch, whom Thucydides considered one 
of the greatest men of his time.z According to Thucydides, 
he was "of an age to comprehend the meaning of the events 
surrounding him" when the Peloponnesian War broke out in 
431, and "at the very moment" that the war began he began to 
l Thucydides, History, Book 4: Section 14, Lines 
103-107. 
z Ibid., Book 8: Section 25, Line 68. 
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write a history of it. 3 In the following year he 
contracted, but survived, the Great Plague that struck 
Athens at that time.• 
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Seven years into the war, Thucydides was commissioned 
as an Athenian general, and was given responsibility for the 
naval defense of Thrace. A man named Eucles ran the army's 
defense of the cit~ from a command center at Amphipolis. 
Brasidas, the greatest of the Spartan generals, defeated the 
army there. Thucydides and Eucles were both exiled for this 
failure, though the historian indicated that he had nothing 
to do with the loss, being at Thasos, at that time. 5 
History gained from this personal disaster. Sparta had 
a policy of allowing Athenian exiles to travel behind their 
lines, perhaps in the hopes that these exiles might be 
induced to take the Spartan side, as Alkibiades eventually 
did. 6 Using this provision to his advantage, Thucydides 
proceeded to travel the Peloponnese, and gain as much 
information as he could about the war, from the enemy's 
perspective. 7 
Thucydides eventually returned to Athens in 404, twenty 
years after his banishment, perhaps under the general 
3 Ibid. I Book 1 : Section 1, Line 1. 
4 Ibid., Book 2 : Section 7, Line 47. 
5 Ibid. I Book 4: Section 14, Line 107. 
6 Ibid., Book 5: Section 16, Line 26. 
7 r Ibid. 
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amnesty. Some have said that he was given a special 
pardon.• Shortly thereafter, he was assassinated in his 
Thracian home.' No one knows why. He was buried at Athens, 
in the vault of Kimon's family. 10 His history was never 
completed. 
Like Herodotus, Thucydides has a clear preference for 
the Athenians in h~s book, and for good reason. Because of 
the war of which he wrote, he saw Sparta more as an 
adversary than did any of the other writers. Those other 
writers tended to write either after the war, or against it. 
Thucydides wanted to justify and explain the war and its 
conclusion. Thus, when he looked at Sparta, he saw the 
enemy. Still a consistent and comprehensible 
characterization of Sparta is presented in the History. 
The most important quality of the Spartan character, 
according to Thucydides, was fear. When the reader is 
introduced to Sparta in a series of three speeches, this 
idea is introduced from the perspective of Sparta's allies, 
its enemies, and, finally, from the perspective of Sparta 
itself. The Korinthians state that Sparta foolishly avoided 
1 R. Feetham, "Biographical Note: Thucydides c460-
c400 B. C." in Herodotus & Thucydides in the series Great 
Books of The Western World, ed. Mortimer Adler, trans. 




war with Athens for fear that they would lose. 11 The 
Athenians, not surprisingly, say that this fear is simply 
wise restraint.1a The Spartan ephor, or magistrate, 
however, calls for and receives a declaration of war from 
the Assembly, soon after the Athenian speech. 13 The ephor 
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does not discuss fear when he speaks, but Thucydides is 
moved to provide an editorial explanation to the effect that 
Sparta's only real cause for going to war is their fear of 
Athenian power. 14 Why did the ephor not say this? Perhaps 
he was afraid to admit the truth in public. 
The source of a great deal of Spartan fear was the 
presence within Sparta of a slave population called the 
helots, which outnumbered the free Spartans. The majority 
of the helots were natives of Messenia, a nation conquered 
by Sparta at the very beginning of its classical era, while 
it was winning control of the Peloponnese. These helots 
were probably the single largest force shaping the policies 
and the general character of Sparta. Thucydides was the 
first of the sources discussed here to consider the 
importance of this slave-class. 
Whenever the Spartan leadership showed signs of 
1 1 Thucydides, History, Book 1: Section 15, Lines 
68-71. 
1a Ibid., Lines 73-78. 
13 Ibid., Lines 86-87. 
14 Ibid., Line 88. 
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weakness, or a crisis of some sort arose to direct the 
government's attention elsewhere, the helots revolted. 15 As 
a result, the Spartans could not afford to go to war without 
being very certain that they could both keep control of the 
situation at home, and attain the objectives of the war 
without taking enough casualties to weaken their defense 
against the helots. At some points during the war it looked 
as if this was becoming impossible, and extraordinary 
measures needed to be taken either to put down the helots or 
to make a short truce with the Athenians. 16 Fortunately for 
the Spartans, they are usually successful in doing both of 
these things. 
Soon after the declaration of war is discussed, as if 
to underscore the significance of fear to Spartan society, 
Thucydides puts this into the mouth of a Spartan king: 
"often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been 
more than a match for a larger force." 17 The king goes so 
far as to warn his armies to be more afraid, saying those 
who are afraid, "shall be at once most valorous in attack 
and impregnable in defense." 18 The portrait depicted by 
these statements, describing how a small army many become 
impregnable in defense through fear, is an excellent 
1 5 Ibid., Book 5: Section 15, Line 14. 
16 Ibid. 
1 7 Ibid., Book 2: Section 11. 
11 Ibid. 
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description of the relationship between the homoioi and the 
helots. 
The Athenians feel differently about this matter. One 
Athenian says that "those who go into battle against far 
superior forces and are under no constraint1 ' must be 
inspired by some extraordinary resolve." 20 Evidently, 
Sparta's allies a~ree with the Athenians on this matter. 
The Kretians warn the Spartans that "Victory is generally on 
the side of those who are more numerous and better 
equipped." 21 They also say that "fear makes a man forget, 
and skill which cannot fight is useless." 22 Perhaps the 
Kretian is referring to the agoge's war-training as the 
skill in question. 
An Athenian general says that the Spartans are more 
afraid of the Athenians than the Athenians are of the 
Spartans. At the same time, the Korinthian general facing 
him confirms this by admitting to his men that "The skill of 
your enemies is something that you greatly dread." 23 Even 
some Spartans, such as General Brasidas, find it necessary 
to stave off his people's fear as he does just before the 
1 g Boldface is mine. 
a o Ibid., Book 3: Section 89. 
2 1 Ibid., Line 87. 
a 2 Ibid. 
a 3 Ibid. 
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battle that would end in his death. 24 
This obsession with fear that Thucydides attributes to 
the Spartans through these speeches should remind one of 
Demaratus's statements to Xerxes. In that speech, he says 
that the people of Sparta are the best warriors in the 
world, because they fear the Law more than the Persians fear 
their emperors. Herodotus goes so far as to capitalize the 
word Nomos, meaning "Law," in his original text, making it 
seem as if Demaratus were talking about a god, and not a 
series of legal enactments.as 
In The History of The Peloponnesian War, Spartans are 
similarly described as fighting out of fear for their polis, 
and, furthermore, out of fear that if they did not fight 
magnificently, they might make a shameful display of 
disloyalty and cowardice before their fellow Spartans. The 
Spartans could play the part of "the most valorous people in 
the world" when facing the enemy, but this is only because 
they feared their own people and institutions much more than 
they could fear any external enemy. 
That is the "constraint" of which Thucydides wrote. It 
renders true "resolution" and courage impossible, but it 
insures kosmos. It is for this reason that the Roman 
historian Plutarch would comment that the Spartans worshiped 
Phobos, the god of fear, as the force that held their city 
2 4 Ibid., Book 4: Section 86. 
2 5 Herodotus, Book 7: Line 107. 
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together. 25 
Another Spartan quality that Thucydides describes is 
constancy. In one of the first speeches Thucydides records 
as having been given before the Spartan Assembly, an ephor 
speaks proudly of Sparta having known no significant change 
since the Persian War. 27 Later, when negotiating a treaty, 
the Spartans reveal a vulnerability inherent in this 
approach. They confidently offer Athens a peace treaty 
based upon what Pericles of Athens requested nearly a decade 
ago, despite the fact that he is dead by that time, and his 
enemies are presently in charge of Athens. 21 
A third element of Thucydides's commentary on Sparta, 
which does not directly relate to one's study of Sparta's 
character as a culture, but does have a bearing, is 
contained in Pericles's famous Funeral Oration. It is in 
this speech that Thucydides relates the first clear contrast 
between Athens and Sparta, depicting them as the opposing 
poles of Greek society. 
What does Pericles and, by logical extension, 
Thucydides say about Athens, as compared to Sparta? First, 
Pericles discusses the originality and social equity of the 
Athenian government. This social equity, he stresses, does 
aa Plutarch, The Life of Kleomenes, Section 9, Lines 
1-2. 
27 Ibid., Section 1, Lines 79-88. 
aa Ibid., Section 4, Lines 117-120. 
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not involve the sacrifice of one's private life, as it might 
in Sparta. 
[FJar from exercising a jealous surveillance over 
each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry 
with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even 
to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot 
fail to be offensive, although they inflict no 
positive penalty. But all this ease in our 
private relations does not make us lawless as 
citizens. 29 
Sparta's system, however, is founded upon the belief that 
constant surveillance is the only means of protecting 
internal security. As far as external security is 
concerned, Pericles says: 
there also we differ from our antagonists. We 
throw open our city to the world, and never by 
alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity 
of learning or observing, although the eyes of an 
enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; 
trusting less in system and policy than to the 
native spirit of our citizens. 30 
This belief in a "native spirit" of loyalty is 
important to Pericles, and to democracy in general. It is 
the democrats' response to the aristocrats' charge that 
Sparta's system of education is superior because such a 
method of indoctrination is needed to teach the citizens 
virtue. Pericles assures his audience that: 
where our rivals from their very cradles by a 
painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens 
we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as 
z , Thucydides, Book 2: Section 37. 
3o Ibid., Section 39. 
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ready to encounter every legitimate danger. 31 
As a result, to the Athenians, "courage [is] not of art 
but of nature," 32 and they 
have the double advantage of escaping the 
experience of hardships in anticipation and of 
facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as 
those who are never free from them. 33 
It is indeed, only- the Athenians who are capable of true 
courage, because 
it is not the miserable that would most justly be 
unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to 
hope for: it is rather they to whom continued 
life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to 
whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous 
in its consequences. 34 
The remainder of Pericles's speech discusses the 
justice of the Athenian cause. He also indicates that while 
the Athenians fight alone on behalf of their friends and 
neighbors, Sparta has felt the need to pull its "allies" in 
the Peloponnesian League, to fight Athens. 35 This might 
have all been true at the time that Pericles spoke, but it 
was not to be true at a later point. That brings one to a 
final consideration regarding how Thucydides saw Sparta. 
As has been said before, Thucydides's primary motive in 
3 1 Ibid. 
3 a Ibid. 
3 3 Ibid. 
3 4 Ibid. I Section 43. 
3 5 Ibid. I Section 39. 
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writing his History in the form that exists today seems to 
be to explain the defeat of Athens. His conclusion is that 
Athens defeated itself by allowing the Periclean faction to 
lose power after the death of its leader. Instead, Kleen, 
and later Alkibiades, took over. These ambitious figures 
alienated Athens's allies by treating them as vassals while 
using the war as ari excuse to expand the Athenian Empire. 
Sparta remained characteristically constant in its policies. 
Athens's hunger for power corrupted the city. Sparta, at 
least at this time, held fast to its principles, and was 
victorious. So, whatever else one might say about Sparta, 
its consistency and coherency more than its military virtues 
gave it victory, while Athens, which seems in the History to 
be, in the modern sense, the more virtuous state, is 
defeated because of its fickle shifting in policy, and not 
because of a lack of military skill. 
CHAPTER V 
ARISTOPHANES 
Aristophanes wrote about one play per year for a period 
of forty years beginning in 425, including the time of the 
Peloponnesian War, and ending in 385, with the playwright's 
death. Of all these plays, only eleven remain. 1 From these 
extant plays, some idea of the playwright's personality may 
be drawn. He was critical of democracy, and was against the 
Peloponnesian War. Often, he portrayed contemporary 
politicians, such as Kleen, as sycophants serving the 
flighty whims of "The People." 2 As a result of the 
unfavorable comments that he made about the archon Kleen in 
The Babylonians, he was fined for "saying ill of the city 
in the presence of foreigners."' 
During the wars, Aristophanes wrote three "peace plays" 
criticizing the Athenians. In these, he indicates that he 
1 Allen H. Sommerstein, "Introduction" in Lysistrata 
and other Plays, ed. Betty Radice, trans. Allen H. 
Sommerstein <London: Penguin Books, 1973), 9-10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Allen H. Sommerstein, "Introduction to the 
Acharnians" in Lysistrata and Other Plays, ed. Betty 
Radice, trans. Allen H. Sommerstein <London: Penguin 
Books, 1973), 42. 
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believes that the Athenians had started the whole affair, 
and that they should take responsibility for ending it. 4 
The writer never suggests that Athens should surrender, but 
he continually calls for the negotiation of an honorable 
peace between these poleis. 
From this circumstantial evidence, it might be 
concluded that Aristophanes favored the aristocratic 
faction. He certainly had more friends among the anti-
democrats than he did among the rest. For example, two of 
Aristophanes's more famous friends were the anti-democrats 
Socrates and Plato. This, however, presented them with no 
defense against the playwright's wit. Both philosophers 
were satirized in Aristophanes's plays. Socrates appears in 
The Clouds, and Plato's ideal republic is satirized in The 
Ecclesiazusae. Neither seems to have minded. Socrates is 
seen treating him as a friend in The Symposium, and Plato 
may have written a poetic eulogy for Aristophanes when he 
died. 
However, it is, perhaps, more fitting to say that 
Aristophanes was critical of the Athenian status guo, 
whatever it was at the moment, than to say that he was a 
staunch anti-democrat. 
aristocrats of Athens. 
He never seems to have praised the 
Aristophanes just poked a little fun 
at whomever was in charge at the time, like a modern 
political satirist. 
4 Aristophanes, The Acharnians, Act 1: Lines 500-550. 
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In Aristophanes's plays, the Spartans are usually 
depicted as speaking in a rustic accent, implying that they 
are an uncultured, simple folk, but they are usually shown 
having more common sense than do their city-dwelling 
opposite numbers. 5 This reflects an attitude toward the 
Spartans that is simultaneously respectful and amused. In 
the end, that is really the most that we get from 
Aristophanes about the Spartans. He does not really dwell 
on them very much. Aristophanes is an Athenian, and he 
writes his plays as a commentary on Athens. Thus, he only 
brings the Spartans into a play to play a role in his 
analysis of Athens. 
Perhaps the best representative of Aristophanes's use 
of Sparta comes in The Birds, where he makes fun of the 
young Athenians who mimic Spartan customs in an attempt to 
learn Spartan virtue. What these "Sparta-happy" young men 
need to remember, he tells us, is that the city of their 
dreams would not let them in to practice the real Spartan 
disciplines, because it has a law refusing the entry of 
unsavory characters. 6 Curiously, these misguided young men 
are also referred to as being "Socrified," indicating that 
Socrates had taught them all this folly. 7 
s For an example see the playwright's use of the 
character Lemphito in the Lysistrata. 
6 Aristophanes, The Birds, Act 1: Line 1282. 
7 Ibid. 
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The few direct commentaries by Aristophanes about 
Sparta come in the peace plays. In the Acharnians, 
Aristophanes's representative, Dikaiopolis, whose name means 
"Just-City," gives a speech wherein he claims that the war 
was Athens's fault.• He hates Sparta just as much as anyone 
else in the audience does, he says, but Athens started the 
conflict. Sparta was simply reacting to the situation as 
well as it could.' Almost everything in this play 
underscores his plea for peace and understanding between the 
two cities, though the war is only directly mentioned in 
this one place. 
The Lysistrata, another peace play, was written during 
the desperate time when Athens was trying to rebuild its 
navy after the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. 10 As this 
play was being performed, most of its viewers expected 
invading armies to appear on the horizon at any moment. Yet 
the play ends with two songs praising Sparta, and describing 
its victories in the war against Persia. 11 That must have 
been an unpleasant thing to hear or to perform. Somehow, 
Aristophanes got away with this open praise of the enemy's 
I Aristophanes, The Acharnians, Act 1: Lines 500-550. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Allen H. Sommerstein, "Introduction to the 
Lysistrata" in Lysistrata and other Plays, ed. Betty 
Radice, trans. Allen H. Sommerstein <London: Penguin 
Books, 1973), 177. 
1 1 Aristophanes, The Lysistrata, Act 2: Lines 1245-1321. 
military powers. 
Like all peace activists, Aristophanes's basic thesis 
was that the Spartans were people just like those of any 
polis, with their own virtues and vices. Like all 
65 
comedians, Aristophanes advanced his ideas by striving to 
reveal his subjects' foibles and laugh at their pretensions, 
whoever those subjects happened to be at the moment. He did 
not concern himself very much with grand military virtues, 
or with idealistic visions of social order, except to laugh 
at them. When ideals, or rather the personifications of 
ideals, are involved in his work, such as "Just Argument" in 
The Clouds, they usually turn out to be flawed creatures who 
are a bit too self-important for their own good. 12 
Occasionally, Aristophanes sh~ws that he is capable of 
reverence. However, it is the Spartans, not the Athenians, 
who seem to be the primary mortal recipients of this 
reverence in the peace plays. Free from the fickle whims of 
the masses, which lead to futile wars, Sparta finds favor in 
the eyes of Aristophanes. 
1 a Aristophanes, The Clouds, Act 2: Lines 905-1114. 
CHAPTER VI 
PLATO 
Born in Athens, probably in the year 428, the 
philosopher Plato was an aristocrat, related to some of the 
most vocal anti-democrats of his day. Certainly, Plato 
himself also felt such sentiments. In The Republic, he, or 
at least his representative character, Socrates, described a 
democracy as being a form of government which is extremely 
vulnerable to disasters caused by choosing bad leaders. He 
says: 
when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets 
bad cup-bearers for its leaders and is intoxicated 
by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine .•.. those 
who obey the rulers ... it reviles as willing slaves 
and men of nought, but it commends and honors in 
public and private rulers who resemble subjects 
and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not 
inevitable that in such a state the spirit of 
liberty should go to all lengthsi ...• The father 
habitually tries to resemble the child and is 
afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to 
the father and feels no awe or fear of his 
parents, so that he may be forsooth a free man. 
And the resident alien feels himself equal to the 
citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner 
likewise .... The teacher in such case fears and 
fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed 
to the teacher or to their overseers either. And 
in general the young ape their elders and vie with 
them in speech and action, while the old, 
accommodating themselves to the young, are full of 
pleasantry and graciousness, imitating the young 
for fear they may be thought disagreeable and 
authoritative .... [N]o one would believe how much 
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freer the very beasts subject to men are in such a 
city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify 
the adage and 'like their mistresses become.' And 
likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on 
their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, 
bumping into everyone who meets them and who does 
not step aside. And so all things everywhere are 
just bursting with the spirit of liberty. 1 
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Still, Plato probably served loyally as a cavalryman during 
the Peloponnesian War. 2 He was a loyal Athenian, even 
though he did not like democracy. 
The turning point of Plato's life came when his friend 
Socrates was executed for heresy and the corruption of the 
young in 399. It is generally supposed that Plato began to 
write his philosophical dialogues immediately thereafter, as 
a defense of Socrates's memory. This, however, cannot be 
confirmed. 
In the aftermath of the execution of their mentor, 
several of Socrates's friends fled to Megara. 3 It is 
uncertain whether Plato was among this group. However, it 
is certain that, in the years following Socrates's death, 
Plato traveled, perhaps to escape Socrates's fate. 4 He may 
have gone as far away as Egypt. In time, he returned to 
Athens and founded his Academy. He remained in Athens until 
1 Plato, Republic, Book 8: Segments 562e-563d. 
a Gilbert Ryle, "Plato," in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 6 Vols., ed. Paul Edwards <New York: MacMillan 




his death at the age of eighty-one. 5 
Plato is an especially difficult author to review. 
This philosopher wrote for a period of forty or fifty years. 
In that time, his opinions varied a great deal. Indeed, 
they changed so much that some later texts were evidently 
written to refute some of his earlier theories. As a 
result, one must always ask which Plato is speaking through 
the writings, the younger or the elder. 
There is also a second related problem. The dialogues 
were originally meant to be a tribute to, and a preservation 
of, Socrates's wisdom. Only later did they become a means 
by which Plato's own ideas could be promulgated. It is not 
certain when Plato changed his thinking. As a result, one 
is never quite certain whose ideas ~re being expressed, 
Plato's or Socrates's. One must not only ask oneself which 
Plato speaks through a particular dialogue, but also whether 
the thoughts that Plato is expressing at any particular time 
are really his at all. 
Furthermore, one must always remember that Plato was a 
philosopher whose goal was the development of his own 
thought. He was not a historian. So, while there might be 
some profit in searching for the stray references that he 
might have made in passing concerning the history of Sparta, 
and then working backwards to try and discover what he might 
have thought about it, one must never forget that one is 
Ibid., 316. 
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indeed working backwards when one is doing this. It is 
unlikely that any of the philosopher's thoughts shall come 
through such a process undistorted. Like Aristophanes, 
however helpful Plato's perspective might be to one's 
understanding of Sparta, he had his own agenda, and he would 
use what he knew about Sparta to support the idea that he 
was trying to explain, not to improve the reader's 
understanding of this polis. 
By comparing the Socrates of Plato's writings to the 
Socrates portrayed in Xenophon's or Aristophanes's works, 
one may develop some idea of what the historical Socrates 
thought on various subjects. For example, the historical 
Socrates's opinions concerning Sparta seem to be universally 
acknowledged as favorable. As has been noted previously, 
Aristophanes referred to the young people who tried to 
emulate Spartan ways and virtues as having been "Socrified," 
as if Socrates was the guru of this clique. 6 Similarly, in 
The Crito, one of Plato's earlier, presumably more 
"historical," works, it is said that Socrates favored the 
Spartan form of government.' As shall be seen, Xenophon's 
Socrates feels similarly. At one point, this version of 
Socrates lectures Pericles, the son of the famous Pericles, 
6 Aristophanes, The Birds, Act 1: Line 1282. 
7 Plato, The Crito, Segment 52e. 
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on the failings of democracy, and the virtues of Sparta.a 
All of the sources available on Socrates agree that he spoke 
well of Sparta, and many of its institutions. 
However, the specific arguments presented in the 
various texts are probably more the work of Plato, 
Aristophanes and Xenophon, than the work of Socrates. First 
of all, the two authors in question agreed with Socrates in 
his favor for Sparta. The majority of Xenophon's works were 
written in the author's own voice, and not through a 
representative character, and in these writings, the 
opinions voiced concerning Sparta were just as affirmative 
as those expressed by the Xenophonic Socrates. In The Laws, 
the one Platonic work where Socrates does not appear, an 
Athenian Stranger, who may represent Plato, himself, 
similarly praises Sparta; and, the two individuals with whom 
he discusses politics are a Kretian and a Spartan, 
representatives of Socrates's two favorite governments. 
Though Sparta is criticized in this work, no supporter of 
democracy is ever brought in to express his opinion on the 
matter of government. This underscores Plato's preference 
for the aristocratic states. 
Secondly, it should be remembered that the ancients had 
different standards of accuracy than exist today. As long 
as the general trend in a figure's thought was well 
• Xenophon, The Memorabilia, Book 3: Section 5, 
Lines 15-17. 
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represented, the speech was considered accurate. Utilizing 
this freedom, authors often shaped these speeches to their 
own ends. It has already been noted that Thucydides did 
this, and there is no reason to suppose that Plato and 
Xenophon did not. So, for the sake of this review, it will 
be presumed that the substance of all the material discussed 
shall voice the ideas and arguments of the authors, at least 
as much as it did the people speaking. 
Whatever solutions one may find to these problems, 
there seem to be common themes in the dialogues upon which 
one may comment, even though Plato's opinions changed over 
the years. The changes reveal the progress of Plato's 
personal intellectual evolution. It stretches from a 
youthful echoing of his teacher to the adolescent 
proclamation that he has found the truth. From there, it 
progresses into a more hesitant, mature inquiry based 
partially upon the knowledge that old certainties may 
crumble with time, and that the most cherished ideas of 
yesteryear might be as hard to defend as the theories of his 
old rivals. If there is no final certainty as to who is 
speaking through the dialogues, or no ultimate philosophical 
theory that one might find there, then at least there are 
continual and developing themes that may be discussed. 
The only Platonic work that is manifestly anti-Spartan 
is the patriotic Menexenus, which many suspect is a satire, 
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or a forgery.' In all other dialogues Sparta is an object 
of admiration. However, this admiration is neither blind 
nor absolute. 
Plato often derides the Spartan agoge for paying no 
heed to the intellectual and moral development of its 
citizens. 10 However, the philosopher is so prejudiced in 
favor of the Spart~n system that, at one point, he claims 
that this apparent lack of intellectual development is an 
illusion generated by the Spartans to lead their foreign 
emulators astray, and assure its continuing supremacy--a 
truly absurd notion. Socrates says: "The most ancient and 
fertile homes of philosophy among the Greeks are Crete and 
Sparta, where are to be found more sophists than anywhere on 
earth." 11 
Note that here Plato, the great enemy of the sophists, 
nevertheless equates the presence of sophists with 
philosophic "fertility." To continue: 
But they [Spartan sophists] conceal 
their wisdom ... and pretend to be fools, 
so that [Spartan] superiority over the 
rest of Greece may not be known to lie 
in wisdom, but seem to consist in 
fighting and courage. Their idea is 
that if their real excellence became 
known, everyone would set to work to 
9 Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 
"Introduction to Memorabilia," in Plato: The Collected 
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become wise. By this disguise they have 
taken in the pro-Spartans in other 
cities, who to emulate them go about 
with bruised ears, bind their hands with 
thongs, take to physical training, and 
wear short cloaks, under the impression 
that these are the practices which have 
made the Spartans a great power in 
Greece; when [The Spartans] want to 
resort freely to their wise men and are 
tired of meeting them in secret, expel 
all resident aliens, whether they be 
sympathizers with the Spartan way of 
life or not, and converse with the 
Sophists unbeknown to any foreigners. 1 a 
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In the rest of the Socratic dialogues, this fiction is 
forgotten, and Sparta's obsession with the military is 
accepted as the tragic flaw that keeps Socrates's favorite 
polis from being perfect. 13 This point is underscored in 
the first of two books in which Sparta is given special 
attention. The first of these books is The Republic, where 
the Platonic ideal city is described. There, "Socrates" 
rates the various forms of government from best to worst. 
The best form of government possible is, of course, a 
republic such as he describes in the text, but he cannot 
provide his audience with an example of such a city in the 
real world. The second best form of government is a 
timocracy, corresponding to the Lakedaemonian 
constitution. 1 ' 
Further examination of The Republic reveals why Sparta 
1 a Ibid. 
1 3 Plato, The Laws, Book 1: Segment 631c. 
1 • Plato, Republic, Book 8: Segment 545b. 
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was held in such favor. In the ideal state of The Republic, 
a person's character and talents determines his place in 
society. 1 s Intellectuals, who have what one might call 
"golden souls" to use Plato's metaphor, govern society as 
"Guardians." 111 Individuals with "bronze" souls, meaning 
that they are without the will to subordinate lower 
appetites to the greater good, are "Artisans." 17 Persons 
with average intelligence, superior self-control, and thus, 
"silver souls" are soldiers. They mediate between the other 
two classes by enforcing the law. 18 
The society described is supposed to be ideal because 
in it everyone is put in their proper place. This is 
Platonic justice. This allows everyone with the capacity to 
do so to pursue "The Good" in their own manner. To Plato 
that is all that is really important. In the metaphor of 
the cave, this Good is described as being the fundamental 
knowledge upon which all other knowledges, judgments, and 
virtues rest. 19 Courage in war is not an end in itself in 
this state, though such bravery can serve a practical value 
for a city striving towards the Good. 
Platonic justice is treated in this text in the same 
1 5 Ibid. I Segment 369. 
1 6 Ibid. I Book 3: Segments 413e-414d. 
1 7 Ibid. I Segment 415. 
1 II Ibid. 
1 ' Ibid. I Book 6: Segment 508. 
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way as courage. It is a virtue that is useful in the 
pursuit of the Good. It is not, in and of itself, The Good. 
A city, one is told, is just when all of its citizens 
operate in their proper place in society, with their efforts 
wholly directed toward the benefit of the whole. In other 
words, a just society is one where kosmos and harmonia are 
absolute and unque~tioned, 20 but a city can be harmonious 
and orderly without being "good." 
The idea of having a society based upon unchanging 
principles, with a rigid class structure where the only 
class with political powers is the one at the top, is very 
Spartan. However, the Spartans instituted their system to 
have the military advantage necessary for them to survive 
and dominate in a state with such an incredible slave 
population. Thus, in Sparta, survival and supremacy, not 
just a place where everyone may seek The Good, is the goal 
of their institutions. Warriors, and not intellectuals, run 
the government. Still, there is a goal toward which all of 
the city's efforts are directed, and there is a strict 
ordering of society, which obliges the citizen to serve that 
end whether he knows it or not. Thus, Sparta 
approaches Platonic justice in its structuring of society, 
or at least it comes closer to this justice than does Athens 
with its looser society that has no real goal to pursue. 
That may be the cause for Plato's admiration of Sparta. 
2 0 Ibid., Book 8: Segment 42lb. 
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Though Sparta may be the best extant government in the 
eyes of Socrates and Plato, The Republic admits that it is 
flawed, and that it does degenerate through the corruption 
and failure of its institutions. This is shown in Plato's 
description of what happens to his ideal state when the 
soldiers and the Guardians share equal political power.a 1 
Supposedly equal land shares, he says, replace communal 
property. a a Violence, not cunning, becomes the traditional 
method of dealing with unrest. War becomes both its supreme 
craft, and the cornerstone of its foreign policy.a 3 
Imperial drives produce a general lust for gold because 
imperialism is based upon the belief that the worth of an 
entity, whether it be a state or a man, is judged upon the 
amount of property that he controls. However, as it is 
illegal to possess private wealth, the citizens enjoy their 
goods in secret, setting them against their own city, which 
becomes even more repressive in response to this 
undercurrent of rebellion. 24 
in Sparta. 
This was the state of things 
When Plato constructs a second model for the ideal 





Ibid., Segments 544-545. 
Ibid., Segment 547c. 
Ibid., Segment 548a. 
Ibid., Segments 548b-c. 
Athenian Stranger, who may be Plato himself. 25 There also 
the reader is introduced to a Spartan who may directly put 
forward and defend his city's ways, making it easier for 
Plato to express, clearly and directly, his opinions 
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concerning the contemporary polis. Furthermore, as this is 
the last text that Plato is known with certainty to have 
written, it is fairly clear that this is the later Plato 
speaking. Many of the interpretational problems that one 
has with The Republic vanish in The Laws. 
In The Laws, Plato claims that there are three forms of 
constitution. The first two are the aristocratic and 
monarchical forms. However, the best constitution of all 
mixes these two forms. 26 Sparta's constitution does this 
with the kings and the Gerousia balancing each other. 27 
Furthermore, the presence of ephors and the Assembly are 
acknowledged to bring the despotic and democratic elements 
into the mixture. 21 
However, Plato does not use Sparta's Rhetra as the 
basis for this second ideal's constitution. He uses 
Athens's constitution as his model. 29 Then, he includes a 
few amendments to this hypothetical document, which subsume 
2 5 Plato, Laws, Book 4: Segment 711a. 
2 6 Ibid. , Segment 693d. 
2 7 Plato, Laws, Book 3: Segments 693d-e. 
2 I Ibid., Book 4: Segments 712d-e. 
2 9 Hooker, Spartans, 235. 
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the virtues of Sparta. For example, Plato does not allow 
the existence of coined money within the polis. 30 Self-
sufficiency is encouraged within this ideal state, to limit 
the amount of contact between the ideal state and the rest 
of the world. 31 Sparta encouraged isolation as well, for 
the same reason. As a further obstacle, he sets his city 
some distance away from the sea, so that trading ships 
cannot reach it. Sparta was similarly isolated. 32 
Technically, Athens was a land-locked polis itself, but it 
had a port-suburb called the Peiraeus to mitigate these 
effects. Plato forbids the development of such a port from 
his polis. 31 
As in Sparta, the land about this polis is divided into 
equal lots and given to the citizens. A minimum amount of 
property is thus assured for each citizen. 34 Sumptuary laws 
provide for a maximum amount of property belonging to each 
citizen. 35 Thus, great disparities in wealth are prevented. 
Citizens of both Sparta and Plato's theoretical polis eat 
in communal messes. In Plato's polis, girls and boys both 
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respect for one's elders. 36 For various reasons, a limit of 
5,040 citizens are allowed within the philosopher's city; 37 
this assures that a population too great to allow for 
Spartan-style peer pressure would not be permitted to 
develop. 31 
Finally, just as the Spartan reformer Lykourgos is 
supposed to have gone off to Delphi either to write the 
Rhetra or to receive it from the gods, his fellow citizens 
never being allowed to ponder which origin was true, so did 
the legislators of this ideal polis meet secretly outside of 
their city. They too are never allowed to reveal the means 
by which they came to their decisions. 39 Plato remains an 
ardent foe of rule by the masses, and by controlling the 
data he hopes to control the people. 
The Laws does not pay blind homage to Sparta. The 
Athenian Stranger, like the Socrates of The Republic, would 
improve on it. One particular flaw that greatly disturbs 
him is Spartan overspecialization. Where Spartans are given 
great training in war, and are enured to its harshness, they 
are not taught how to deal with pleasure for fear that 
exposure to it will distract them from war. 40 As a result, 
3 II Ibid. I Book 2: Segments 666e-667a. 
3 7 Ibid. I Segment 737e. 
3 I Ibid., Book 6: Segments 762c-766b. 
3 9 Ibid. , Book 10: Segment 908a. 
4 0 Plato, Laws, Book 1 : Segment 634b. 
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the Stranger says they have no experience with, nor in-built 
defense against the lures of pleasure. 41 Indeed, they are 
falling inexorably under the spell of such pleasures. 42 A 
jaded man is less likely to be seduced, just as a man who 
knows pain is less afraid of feeling it, but the Spartans 
are only taught to deal with pain. Pleasure easily defeats 
them. Thus, Plato· subtly explains the corruption that 
eventually resulted in Sparta's fall. 42 
Elsewhere in the dialogues, other flaws are mentioned. 
They too are flaws of overspecialization. For example, in 
the Laches, the Spartans are eager for war because of their 
training. They do not know what to do with themselves when 
they are not in the midst of a death-struggle. 44 
Furthermore, as is said in the Hippias Major, the Spartans 
are ignorant of almost anything except war. 
even count. 45 
Some cannot 
Despite all of this, however, Plato treats Sparta as 
the most favored of the poleis. Its institutions were 
divine48 and its people the most law-abiding in Greece. 47 
4 1 I bid. , Book 1 : Segment 634a. 
4 2 I bid. I Segments 636b-637c. 
4 s Ibid. 
4 4 Plato, The Laches, Segment 183a. 
4 5 Plato, The Hippias Major, Segment 285c. 
4 e Plato, Laws, Book 1: Segment 624a. 
47 Plato, Hippias Major, Segment 28Sb. 
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It was the "protector of Greece." 41 Sometimes the 
philosopher goes out of his way to shield them from 
criticism. For example, Plato is the only figure to provide 
the Spartans with a decent excuse for their absence from the 
Battle of Marathon. 49 
So, while individual aspects of Plato's opinions on 
Sparta changed, his general view of it remained constant. 
This view is very similar to the opinions already expressed 
by Herodotus and Thucydides. Plato, and his version of 
Socrates, see Sparta as a state of unparalleled kosmos and 
harmonia directed wholly towards the preservation of 
military supremacy through the generation of military 
excellence. He also sees this concentration upon military 
virtue as causing a tragic overspecialization, which 
eventually results in the decline of the timocracy through 
non-military dangers. 
Sparta's tragic flaw, in Plato's eyes, was the goal 
towards which all of its efforts were directed and this is 
significant. Militarism was the defining goal that made 
Lykourgan Sparta what it was. While it might have been 
possible for a second reformer to have adapted some of 
Sparta's institutions to Plato's goals and thereby, 
according to Plato, have assured Sparta's survival, the 
product of this change would not have been the city of 
4 I Plato, Laws, Book 3: Segment 692a. 
4 , Ibid., Book 3: Segment 698e. 
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Lykourgos. That city, it seems, was fated to fall, at least 
according to Plato's critique of it. 
That makes Plato, an aristocrat, sound like the 
democrats. How could this be so? Sparta might have been 
the Greek champion of aristocracies, but there are other 
ways to have aristocratic governments. As a result, an 
aristocrat could oppose Sparta, while supporting 
aristocracy, just as Plato could appreciate the capacity of 
the Lykourgan Reforms to discipline and focus the efforts of 
the individual on a single goal, while disagreeing with the 
goal, itself. There is no hypocrisy or contradiction in 
Plato's comments. 
Sparta might very well have been the most orderly and 
focused polis in Greece. Plato and Socrates might have 
thought it the best polis in Greece as a result, but that 
was not enough. Thus, it fell. It fell through its 
decreased resistance to corrupting influences, and as a 
result of its lust for gold. It also fell because of its 
fear of rebellion amongst the lower "artisan" class of 
helots. This fear forced Sparta to become more militaristic 
and more brutal as time passed, and it was this militarism 
that was the source of its flaws. At least that is what 
this interpretation of The Republic and The Laws implies. 
CHAPTER VII 
XENOPHON 
Xenophon was born in Athens sometime between the years 
430 and 423 to a family that was well-connected, but not 
necessarily rich. He was raised in the southern Athenian 
deme of Erchia during the Peace of Nicias, which separated 
the first and second halves of the Peloponnesian War. 1 This 
peaceful, secure way of life ended when the return to 
hostilities between Sparta and Athens once again made the 
Ionian outlands unsafe. Xenophon returned to Athens, and 
there he met Socrates, whom he would later remember in his 
writings as a great friend and teacher. Xenophon may have 
served in the cavalry and the navy during the Second 
Peloponnesian War. While he was serving in the war, 
Spartans captured him.a A Boeotian friend had him ransomed 
and Xenophon was back in Athens when the war finally ended. 3 
In 401, Xenophon joined an expedition under the Persian 
Prince Kyrus that attempted to take Persia's Imperial 
1 J. K. Anderson, Xenophon, <New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1974), 14. 




Throne. The attempt, and Xenophon, along with the generally 
Spartan mercenaries who made up part of the army, was 
trapped deep in hostile territory. By a circuitous path the 
Spartans made it back to Greece only to find that Sparta was 
launching its own expedition against Persia. The Spartan 
troops turned back east, but at this point Xenophon left 
them and returned to Athens. 4 There he found that his 
mentor had been executed, and he had been banished, in 
absentia. He left, and would never see Athens again. 5 
Xenophon spent much of the remainder of his life in 
Sparta, where he wrote the majority of his books. They 
included several reminiscences of Socrates, a history of 
Kyrus's expedition, several "How-To" books, a history of 
Greece during his lifetime, and a study of Spartan society. 
His sons would return to aid Athens at the battle of 
Mantinea in 362, and would be accepted there as heroes, 6 but 
Xenophon himself remained in Krete to which the Spartans 
exiled him in 371. 7 He died there sometime after 356. 8 
Of all the figures whose views of Sparta are reported 
herein, Xenophon certainly had the greatest opportunity to 
study the Spartans, having lived with them and been a friend 
The story is related in Xenophon's book The Anabasis. 
Anderson, Xenophon, 148-149. 
e Ibid., 194-195. 
7 Ibid. I 166. 
I Ibid. I 192. 
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of one of their kings for thirty years.' Indeed, Xenophon's 
two sons were both raised in the Spartan agoge system that 
he outlined in his essay, The Constitution of the 
Lakedaemonians. 10 With this in mind, it does not seem too 
surprising to discover that in his works, Xenophon, like 
Plato, praised Sparta and the Spartan way, comparing it 
favorably to that of Athens, even though he might have 
fought against Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. 
Despite all of this, however, the older Xenophon 
developed severe reservations about his new home as early as 
382, when Sparta took Thebes. 11 He saw the seizure of the 
Theban akropolis as a betrayal of Sparta's treaty 
obligations, a heresy against the gods, and as a harbinger 
of doom. 12 Surely, he warned in his Hellenica, the gods 
would exact a terrible revenge for this crime. 13 So, in 
those later years, Xenophon, like Plato, found himself 
reduced to explaining the reasons for Sparta's fall while 
praising it, or at least its culture, above all others. 
Oddly enough, the work in which Xenophon says the most 
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11 Ibid., 169-171. 
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l 3 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 5: Section 2, Lines 25-
tells us the least about them. Thucydides died before he 
could complete his History of the Pelopennesian War, but 
Xenophon concluded the story of the war in the seven books 
of his Hellenica, possibly working off of Thucydides's 
notes. Tellingly, the Hellenica begins by relating the 
events of 411 using the phrase "Not many days after this." 
As Xenophon is trying to finish another man's work, and 
trying to write a history of the war, not a commentary on 
it, he holds his own personality in check, and merely 
relates facts about who did what, when, where and why. 
Then, the Hellenica continues beyond the war to the 
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year 362, when the author was seventy years old. When the 
story of the war ends, Xenophon slips out of the objective 
narrative mode, and some of his prejudices become more 
easily apparent in the remainder of the work. He devoted 
Book Two of the Hellenica to the short "Golden Age" of 
Spartan power, when it was the supreme power in Greece. 
This era represents the high point of Spartan power and 
virtue, much as Pericles's Funeral Oration is, for 
Thucydides, the apex of Athenian history. Things turn for 
the worse thereafter. 
the end. 
Book Three details the beginning of 
Interestingly, the turning point in Xenophon's history 
of Sparta is Kyrus's attempt to win the Persian throne. As 
has already been noted, Xenophon was present during the 
first failed campaign to conquer Persia. This effort he 
87 
remembers as a great and noble struggle, in which the 
Spartans repaid Kyrus for his aid during the Peloponnesian 
War by supporting his attempt. Unfortunately, it failed, 
and the Greeks were forced to fight their way back home. 
Then, Sparta launched a second, all-Greek expedition to 
conquer Persia. By this time, however, Kyrus was dead. Why 
launch a second army? 
The Spartans simply did not know how not to be at war 
with someone. Having conquered Greece, they simply moved on 
to the next great challenge--Persia. There was no noble 
cause to propel the Spartans this time. Sheer greed 
motivated them. 14 Xenophon left the expedition, just before 
the Persians destroyed it. 15 Then, everything began to go 
wrong. Several Ionian states rebelled and Sparta was forced 
to put these rebellions down with a diminished army. Sparta 
lost as often as it won, and its control over Greece 
crumbled. 16 Strategies to regain and retain power became 
more desperate and ruthless. Finally, a revived Athens made 
an alliance with Thebes, supposedly a member of the 
Peloponnesian League. Sparta completely over-reacted, 
14 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 3: Section 1, Lines 3 -
Section 2, Line 20; Sections 4, Lines 1-29. 
1 5 Ibid., Section 4: Lines 1-2. 
16 Ibid., Book 3: Section 1, Line 3 -Section 2, 
Line 20; Section 2, Lines 21-31; Book 4: Section 2, Line 9; 
Section 6, Lines 1-7; Book 5: Section 1, Lines 1-28; 
Section 2, Lines 1-7; Lines 20-24; Lines 37-43; Section 3, 
Lines 25-36; Section 4, Lines 13-62; Line 64; Lines 60-66. 
conquering the city and taking its akropolis, the hill-
fortress/temple that was the city's most sacred ground. 17 
After relating the story of Sparta's conquest of 
Thebes, Xenophon announces his disillusion with Sparta, 
saying: 
Now one could mention many other incidents, both 
among Greeks and barbarians, to prove that the 
gods do not fail to take heed of the wicked or of 
those who do unrighteous things; but at present I 
will speak of the case which is before me. The 
Lakedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they 
would leave the states independent, after seizing 
possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were 
punished by the very men, unaided, who had been 
thus wronged, although before that time they had 
not been conquered by any single one of all the 
peoples that ever existed; while as for those 
among the Theban citizens who had led them into 
the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in 
subjection to the Lakedaemonians in order that 
they might rule despotically themselves, just 
seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the 
government of these men. How all this came to 
pass I will proceed to relate. 11 
After this point, the slow decline and defeat of Sparta 
takes on a feeling of inevitability. Nemesis is served. 
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Through it all, however, it seems that Xenophon holds true 
to the idea that the Spartan regimen represented the 
greatest cultural accomplishment in Greek history. He seems 
to believe that it did not fail. It was, in his mind, the 
Spartan people who failed. 19 Other works by Xenophon seem 
to corroborate this interpretation. 
1 7 Ibid., Book 5: Section 1. 
1 I Ibid., Book 5: Section 4, Lines 1-4. 
1 9 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Lines 1-4. 
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While he was writing the Hellenica, Xenophon also wrote 
several Socratic dialogues, an autobiography of Kyrus, and a 
review of the Spartan state called The Constitution of the 
Lakedaemonians. In the Constitution, Xenophon heaps his 
greatest praise upon the Spartan culture, and at the same 
time, writes his harshest judgment on contemporary Spartans, 
saying: 
If anyone were to ask me whether I think the laws 
of Lykourgos remain unchanged, I certainly could 
not bring myself to assert that they do. I am 
aware that in former days the Spartans chose to 
live at home together on modest means and not to 
become harmosts 20 in other states, where they 
would be flattered and corrupted. I am aware also 
of their going in fear, at one time, of being 
found in possession of gold; but now there are 
some who actually boast of having it. I 
understand that previously there were regulations 
providing for the expulsion of foreigners and also 
that citizens were not permitted to live abroad, 
in case they acquired degenerate habits from 
foreigners; whereas now I conceive that the men 
who have the highest repute at Sparta set their 
hearts on becoming perpetual harmosts in foreign 
territory. 21 
Note the progression of Sparta from virtue to vice, as it is 
described in this passage. It is a familiar one. Once, the 
Spartans lived together, in a state of fear. They were kept 
in line by their fear of the scorn of their fellows. Then, 
they gained power. They lost their fear. They lost their 
unity. Soon, the forces to which they exposed themselves 
corrupted them. 
2 0 Harmosts: War lords. 
a 1 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Line 1-4. 
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Xenophon is obliged to believe something like this. 
His contemporary Sparta was in a miserable condition. It 
was certainly not one that he would attribute to Lykourgos, 
who "reached the utmost limit of wisdom ... not by imitating 
other states, but by devising a system utterly different 
from that of most others." 22 
There is definitely evidence supporting Xenophon's 
claim that there was a degeneration of Sparta from its 
Lykourgan state. After one hundred and fifty years of 
functioning with apparently acceptable results, the ephors 
and the veto power of the Gerousia are added to the Rhetra, 
without any indication of Apollo's advise being consulted. 23 
Already the "perfect" government of Sparta needed reforming, 
apparently because its god-like kings were not trustworthy 
enough to wield their great power. 
Gradually, the kings lost power, and the ephors gained 
Originally, the king had unrestricted power over 
Sparta's military, but Kleomenes's abuse of this power led 
to the power to levy troops and declare war being taken from 
him. 25 Once again, despite the aristocrats' claim that the 
agoge taught unshakable loyalty and military virtue, it 
a a Ibid., Section 1, Line 2. 
2 3 Plutarch, The Life of Agesilaus, Section 11. 
2 4 Jones, Sparta, 27. 
25 Ibid., 15; Thucydides, History, Book 1: Line 87; 
Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 3: Section 2, Lines 23-25. 
turned out that the kings who graduated from that process 
could not be trusted with the power that Lykourgos granted 
them. Eventually, the kings had become mere operatives of 
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the Assembly and not a co-equal branch of government as the 
Reformer had intended.a 1 
For a further example of this sort of degeneration 
consider the end result of the Spartans' quest for equity 
amongst its citizens. It ended in a highly unequal caste 
system. The homoioi represented the ruling class of Sparta, 
and theoretically was composed of its entire citizen body 
with each member having equal power, in the community. 
However, from the beginning the homoioi women were not 
treated as full citizens. Female citizens participated in 
an agoge of their own much like that of the men, and they 
were afforded more rights than women in any other polis, 
much to Aristotle's chagrin, but they were not treated as 
equals. 27 
Within the class of the homoioi men there was another 
level of inequity. The Spartans were given equal shares of 
land, but the shares, determined to be equal because they 
consisted of equal areas of land, did not have equal levels 
of production. The means by which economic equity was meant 
to be assured became the means of destroying that equity. 
Then, as time passed and against the express wish of 
a 1 Plato, Laws, Book 3: Segments 691e-692c. 
a 7 Aristotle, Politics, Book 2: Chapter 6, Pages S-9. 
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Lykourgos, a landless citizen class was developed. The 
hypomeiones were the highest-ranking class of these landless 
citizens. They were the younger sons of citizens who could 
not receive land due to a land shortage. 28 If their elder 
brothers died childless they would advance to become 
homoioi. The Tresantes, or "tremblers," had homoioi 
ancestors who were disgraced either for showing fear in 
battle, or for being unable to pay their mess fees. In some 
way they had their full rights stripped from them. 29 
Beneath them on the social scale were the mothakes. 30 They 
were helot children adopted by homoioi families and treated 
as members of that class, though they was always treated as 
the last amongst the equals. 31 All classes were required to 
go through the agoge. 
Next on the class chain was an intermediary class of 
people who neither possessed land nor citizen rights, but 
were still taught in the agoge and were required to fight in 
the army. Favored helots or perioikoi could become 
neodamodeis. 3 2 Xenophon's two sons were members of this 
2 I Ibid., Segment 132, Segment 145. 
21 Ephraim David, "Laughter in Spartan Society," in 
Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success, ed. Anton 
Powell (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 
14-16. 
so Ibid., 37-38. 
31 H. Michell, Sparta, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1987), 69. 
3 2 Forrest, History, 124. 
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class. 33 
Below the neodamodeis on the social scale came a class 
of non-citizen males called the perioikoi. These perioikoi, 
or "outsiders" as the word meant, lived in outlying villages 
or komai of Lakedaemonia. 34 They had no rights and were 
given no favors, but at least they were not helots. 35 
The helots were simply slaves who worked the kleroi and 
performed the day to day menial tasks of the city. The "old 
helots" who were descendants of the conquered citizens of 
Lakonian poleis were generally considered the more loyal and 
less feared of the helots. The "new helots" were the 
descendants of Messenian prisoners of war. The Messenians 
were seen as being more dangerous because they had a 
stronger sense of national identity. Much that the homoioi 
did in the name of military excellence and unity was done in 
preparation for possible helot rebellions. 3 & 
Though Spartans claimed to be equals, they could only 
be equals within the bounds of their own class of 
Lakedaemonians, and even this equality was doubtful. This 
claim was intended to show how egalitarian Spartans were but 
really showed the incredible elitism of Sparta, because it 
33 Diogenes Laertus, The Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers, Book 2: Section 6, Line 53. 
3 4 Jones, Sparta, 8. 
3 5 Michell, Sparta, 72. 
3 & Thucydides, Book 4: 
14, Life 23. 
Section 41; Book 5: Section 
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indicated that the Spartans thought that only this class 
represented their society. The weakness of this hypocritical 
system was especially evident when the homoioi, like all 
closed aristocracies, began to shrink37 while the other 
classes grew. This further centralized the power and the 
luxuries of the polis while increasing the burdens of the 
other classes. The idea of creating a society of equals so 
that these equals could retain absolute power within a 
larger society composed largely of inferiors was a paradox 
gnawing at the heart of the Spartan way of life. 
This decline had an effect on every other aspect of the 
Spartan regimen. By the end of the Classical Age, the 
number of homoioi was so small that the army of Sparta was 
regularly drawn from the other classes. By the 371 the army 
was almost entirely made up of armed helots and perioikoi 
who had never undergone agoge training. 3 • When this 
happened Sparta's justification for initiating the Reforms 
in the first place had vanished, and all of the goals that 
those Reforms had worked toward had been abandoned. Spartan 
homoioi were now dependant on their helots for the defense 
of their privileges. 
their fathers' ways. 
The Spartans had fallen very far from 
The product of Sparta's original system was, in 
Xenophon's eyes, "virtue," which to him consisted primarily 
3 1 Forrest, History, 136. 
3a Ibid., 132-134. 
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of excellence in war. In the Constitution, he breaks this 
concept of virtue down into different qualities, stretching 
from physical hardiness to obedience, to the ability to 
maneuver well in a drill. Then he shows how the agoge or 
the Rhetra addresses this need excellently, despite, and 
perhaps because of, the fact that they are unlike the 
institutions of other poleis. 3 ' They seem to be, in the 
author's eyes, the one sensible set of institutions in the 
world. 40 
Xenophon clearly and directly compares Athens and 
Sparta in his Socratic dialogues, where he uses Socrates to 
express his own opinion about the two. For example, in the 
Memorabilia, Socrates is seen lecturing Pericles, the son of 
the famous Pericles, in this fashion: 
when will the Athenians show the Lakedaemonian 
reverence for age, seeing that they despise all of 
their elders, beginning with their own fathers? 
When will they adopt the Lakedaemonian system of 
training, seeing that they not only neglect to 
make themselves fit, but mock at those who take 
the trouble to do so? When will they reach that 
standard of obedience to their rulers, seeing that 
they make contempt of their rulers a point of 
honor? Or when will they attain that harmony, 
seeing that, instead of working together for the 
general good, they are more envious and bitter 
against one another than against the rest of the 
world, are the most quarrelsome of men in public 
and private assemblies .•. ? So it comes about that 
evil and mischief grow apace in the city, enmity 
and mutual hatred spring up among the people, so 
that I am always fearing some evil past bearing 
' 9 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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may befall the city.41 
Athens lost everything that was important to it in the 
aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. This included a good 
many illusions concerning the great power that they thought 
a democratic city would always have. The Athenian democrats 
thought that because the practice of democratically 
participating in the city's policy-making allowed each 
citizen to see himself in the city and to see the city in 
himself, each citizen would always serve his polis freely 
and to the best of his ability. This, they thought, would 
make such a city unbeatable. 4 a Instead, all that Athens 
seems to have gained from its democracy was a fickle 
distemper amongst the citizens. This led to the bad 
decisions that defeated Athens, long before Sparta did. The 
Athenians had to find a way of dealing with this loss. This 
need motivated a great deal of the intellectual activity of 
the age. 
Xenophon found solace in the fact that his old friend, 
Socrates, warned of the dangers of democracy long before the 
war began. 43 Banished from Athens for his views, Xenophon 
became a Lakedaemonian, one of the winners, and remained one 
for pretty much the rest of his life. However, this 
4 1 Xenophon, Memorabilia, Book 3: Section 5, Lines 
15-17. 
4 a Herodotus, Line 5: Section 81. 
43 Ibid. 
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physical and psychological closeness to the Spartans also 
gave him a cruelly clear perspective of the fall of Sparta. 
How was he to reconcile these two facts? 
An aristocrat by temperament, Xenophon chose to believe 
that the fall of Sparta was the result of the 
Lakedaemonians' inability to adhere to a perfect system. 44 
In that way, he was at least able to stay loyal to the ideal 
of Sparta, if not to Sparta itself. It is uncertain why he 
thinks that the Spartans were unable to retain the 
discipline of their forefathers, but the most likely source 
of this corruption is the expansion of Spartan power through 
Greece, which forced the Spartans to come into contact with 
the rest of the world, exposing it to infection from foreign 
vices. At least, that is what the sections that have been 
quoted imply. 
directly. 
Xenophon never seemed to address the subject 
Xenophon produced the greatest single mass of work 
devoted to Sparta and the Spartan legend to come out of the 
Classical Era. His writings are not as intellectually 
challenging, or as insightful as those of Plato, but they 
have their strengths. Through these works, the vision of 
Sparta that would remain with history to the present day was 
established. However, any objective review of Sparta's 
history indicates that Xenophon's interpretation of its 
degeneration is overly simplistic. 
4 4 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Lines 1-4. 
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Sparta was never really free of the flaws that 
eventually destroyed its empire. Herodotus showed that they 
were working before the Persian Wars, just as they would 
after the Peloponnesian Wars.• 5 For example, the imperial 
drive that would eventually lead to the conquest of Athens 
and the invasion of Persia is just as manifest in the 
conquest of the Peloponnese while the Reforms were being 
established, as it is thereafter.• 6 
All that really changed between these two eras is the 
amount of gold and power to which the Spartans came into 
contact. In the later wars at least twice the land area and 
many times the resources won in earlier conquests were in 
the offing as booty. Thus, flaws that were already present 
might have done greater damage to Sparta than was done 
before, because those flaws had more tools by which they 
could undermine Sparta's military power and way of life. 
Furthermore, Sparta's agoge was intended, in part, to 
prepare the homoioi to deal with corrupting influences. One 
might, therefore, conclude that a Spartan only "fell away" 
from his city's institutions for one of two reasons. Either 
the city's indoctrination techniques were a failure in their 
own right, or, there exists a general indominability of the 
•s Herodotus, Historia, Book 4: Line 8; Book 5: 
Line 34; Book 6: Lines 64-67; Book 8: Line 103; Book 9: 
Line 11; Lines 15-16; Line 29; Lines 49-88. 
46 Ibid., Book 1: Lines 64-59, Line 82; Book 3: 
Lines 48-49; Book 4: Lines 147-152. 
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human spirit, which would prevent any such system from 
taking hold. 
In either case, Sparta was in trouble. If the first 
option is true, then Sparta might have been saved, if the 
changes needed to solve these problems were sufficiently 
superficial. However, no means of making such reforms has 
been put forward by any of the authors, except for Plato, 
whose reforms were so radical that the city that would have 
been produced would not have resembled Lykourgan Sparta 
sufficiently for one to say that Lykourgos's product 
survived in Plato's society. If the second option is true, 
then Sparta was doomed from the start. 
Xenophon, is easily the most helpful of the aristocratic 
primary sources that survived to this day. His writings 
have flaws. For example, his analysis is less rigorous than 
that of Plato or Herodotus, perhaps as a result of his love 
of the Spartan way. Still, it is relatively easy to pick 
his analysis from the great mass of data that he supplies. 
There has been some criticism of Xenophon by those who point 
out his incompleteness in places, and his prejudices for 
Sparta; 47 but still, the things that he says about Sparta 
itself make him very useful to the student of that city's 
culture, if the student is willing to read critically. 
47 Carleton L. Brownson, "Introduction to Xenophon," 




!socrates was both the last great Classical author, and 
the first great Hellenic author. He straddles the ages of 
Pericles of Athens and Philip of Macedon in the length of 
his life, as well as in the development of his views. The 
majority of his speeches were delivered after the power of 
Sparta was finally broken in 371. However, !socrates wrote 
several important speeches concerning Sparta during his 
lifetime, some of which were written within the era that is 
being studied here. 
together. 
These speeches should be examined 
!socrates was born in 436, one of five children of the 
wealthy flute maker, Theodorus. As a result of his father's 
great wealth, !socrates studied under the greatest sophists 
of the age. 1 In time, he became Socrates's friend. 
!socrates and his family lost their wealth in the 
Peloponnesian War, and he took up speech writing to earn a 
living.z Later, he opened a school in Athens. Despite its 
exorbitant tuition, it had the largest student body in the 
1 !socrates, The Antidosis, Lines 161. 




As a side-line, !socrates wrote political pamphlets in 
the form of speeches. All but one of these have survived 
until today. In these writings one discovers a vain, but 
practical man with a sharp mind and a great love of Athens. 
One also finds a staunch democrat.• However, !socrates was 
very critical of the people of contemporary Athens and its 
form of democracy, of which he said: "they looked upon 
insolence as democracy, lawlessness as liberty, impudence of 
speech as equality, and licence to do what they pleased as 
happiness." 5 This writer's desire was to help a new Athens, 
purged of its imperialist ambition, an ideal example of 
self-control, to take shape out of the remains left over 
from the Peloponnesian War. When this happened, he 
believed, Athens would once again take its proper place as 
the leader of Greece. Then he would be able to achieve his 
second goal--the formation of a united Greek state capable 
of battling Persia for control of both Europe and Asia.& 
As to Sparta, !socrates had ambiguous feelings. It 
came as close as any polis ever did to !socrates's goal, but 
it failed spectacularly. The author eventually chose to see 
Sparta as being the symbolic twin of Athens. Like Athens, 
3 Ibid., Lines 39-41. 
4 !socrates, The Areopagiticus, Lines 20-27. 
5 Ibid., Line 20. 
6 !socrates, The Panegyricus, Line 182. 
102 
he said, it was once a paragon of self-control and 
moderation.' Isocrates describes the agoge as a great 
teacher of these traits.• However, imperialist ambition 
corrupted Sparta. It conquered Greece for power's sake. It 
acted not to unite Greece, but to exploit it.' 
it fell to the effects of its own greed. 10 
Like Athens, 
Philip and Al~xander of Macedonia, who, together, 
managed to fulfill Isocrates's dream, had a different 
stratagem. They always respected the customs and culture of 
the people they conquered, in contrast to the Spartans' 
method of fulfilling the Panhellenic goal. For example, 
after Philip gained power over Greece in the Battle of 
Chaeronea, he called for a meeting of the Hellenic League, 
which made him its Captain-General, legitimizing his 
authority. When Philip, and later, Alexander, exercised 
their power over Greece, they always acted through the 
authority that the title gave them. Sparta, on the other 
hand, used its armies as its only justification for its 
authority. In his last work, Isocrates showed how greatly he 






it might have earned Isocrates's approval, and it 
Ibid., Lines 80-81. 
Isocrates, The Panathenaicus, Lines 109-112. 
Isocrates, Peace, Lines 68-70. 
Isocrates, To Philip, Lines 47-50. 
11 Ibid., Lines 13-19. 
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might not have fallen, but such diplomacy was not taught in 
the agoge. 
In such speeches as the Archidamus, The Nicocles, On 
the Peace and The Panegyricus, !socrates explains that 
Sparta began as a most respectable and virtuous polis. 12 In 
the Archidamus, Isocrates defends the Spartan right to rule 
Messenia, but whiie doing so he reviews the history of 
Sparta and he praises Sparta's institutions in much the same 
tone and manner that Xenophon does in his Constitution. The 
traditional praise given to Sparta for the unchanging 
endurance of its institutions, and the military prowess of 
its citizens, punctuates even the most critical of the 
author's discussions of its ways. 13 
In 380 Isocrates wrote The Panegyricus. There he 
further expands upon the nature of this Spartan virtue, 
giving the reader a better idea of why it was so excellent. 
Both Athens and Sparta, he says, were once paragons of the 
virtue, sophrosyne, meaning both moderation and self-
control. 14 This made both poleis perfect representatives of 
their different races, the Achaeans and the Dorians. Each 
of the two poleis had naturally defined spheres of interest. 
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with the world.1 5 Then, sometime after the Persian War, 
both got greedy and reverted to power-hungry conquerors. 1 & 
The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War taught that 
polis moderation, and now it was ready to lead the Greeks 
once again in another campaign against Persia. 17 
would also have a role to play in this campaign. 
Sparta 
It would 
be Athens's partner--its junior partner, that is--but first 
it would have to purify itself of its old vices and return 
to its proper ways. 18 
In his plea for a peace between these two powers, 
!socrates tries to set the two on an equal footing in all 
things, including guilt, as the foundation for a new Pan-
Hellenic alliance. Still, he cannot leave the old formula 
behind him. He too thinks of Sparta as an excellent polis 
brought low through its citizens' tragic flaw; in his mind 
this flaw was imperialistic greed. 19 
In Panegyricus, !socrates calls for Athens to accept 
his interpretation of history, and so the speech was 
generally about Athens's fall from grace and its slow return 
to glory. The Panathenaicus, is the work of an ill man who 
is a year from his death, reviewing his life and era. 
1 5 Ibid., Line 15. 
1 & Ibid., Lines 52-54. 
1 7 Ibid., Line 99; Line 115. 
1 I Ibid., Line 17. 
1 9 !socrates, Peace, Lines 94-98. 
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Sparta had, by this time, fallen, and it looked as if his 
dreams of a unified Greek campaign had only led to the 
disastrous defeat of the Spartan army. Philip of Macedonia 
had yet to revive Isocrates's hopes. It looked as if the 
classical age had ended in the fall of Greek culture to its 
Persian enemy. 
Isocrates blamed the Spartans for everything. Had 
Sparta thought of their new empire from Isocrates's Pan-
Hellenic standpoint, he thinks, it could have meant the 
fulfillment of his dream of a unified Greek nation.ao 
Instead, they took a tyrannical stance, and when it came 
time to move against Persia, the Spartans did not have the 
full loyalty of a united Greece. Indeed, many Greeks had 
sold their services to Persia as mercenaries. They had more 
interest in the defeat of the Spartans, who had mounted the 
invasion in an attempt at fulfilling their ever-increasing 
lust for power, than they had in the triumph of a Greek 
power over their culture's traditional arch-enemy.a 1 If the 
invasion had been a truly Pan-Hellenic effort, for the sake 
of all, things would have been different. 
In the midst of this diatribe, the "Isocrates" 
character of the speech turns the floor over to one of his 
pupils who defends Sparta and praises it for its stable 
a o Ibid., Lines 67-70. 
a 1 Isocrates, Philip, Lines 47-50. 
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institutions, just as Isocrates does in the Archidamus.aa 
Why does the author make this awkward shift? Once again one 
sees the tension between two ideas concerning Sparta. On 
one hand, Sparta is seen as having been a noble, virtuous 
state that still lived according to institutions that were 
handed down from the gods. On the other hand, Sparta is 
also seen as having become an immoderate tyrant that has 
fallen from the grace of its noble institutions. Her fall 
was understood as an inevitable visitation of Nemesis upon 
the hubristic. While dreaming of Sparta's virtues, 
Isocrates looks at his contemporary Sparta with 
disappointment. In essence, the Archidamus, and the 
second section of the Panathenaicus, is a "before" portrait. 
The first section of the Panathenaicus is the corresponding 
"after" portrait. The Panegyricus ties the two together by 
describing the causes for Sparta's fall from its ideal 
state, which, the writer tells his audience, occurred at the 
end of the Persian War. 
aa Isocrates, Panathenaicus, Line 233. 
CHAPTER IX 
SURVIVAL IN A CHANGING WORLD 
The city of Sparta was the subject of a great deal of 
fascination among classical intellectuals. Perhaps this 
fascination was simply born of the fact that Sparta was, in 
many ways, the most successful and important of the Greek 
city-states for many years. 1 However, it must also have 
been the result of the city's bizarre institutions, which 
were different from those of the majority of Greek poleis. 
Indeed, as Xenophon said, Sparta's methods of operation were 
directly opposed to the methods of every other city in the 
Greek cultureZ--though Krete might be considered an 
exception to this observation. Why did Sparta choose such a 
peculiar set of institutions? If these institutions were so 
successful, why did other cities not emulate them? If the 
Spartans were so successful, why did the city, its army, 
empire, and institutions all collapse so quickly and so 
completely after Sparta won its hegemony over Greece? These 
are the basic questions that have defined the study of 
Classical Sparta from the Classical Age to the Modern Day. 
1 
z 
Thucydides, His~ory, Book 1: Section 18, Line 2. 
Xenophon, Constitution, Section 1, Line 2. 
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The contemporary authors who wrote about Classical 
Sparta may be divided into two social categories. 
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Herodotus, Thucydides, and !socrates were democrats, and 
democrats tended to see Sparta as a stronghold of 
aristocrats, and as such a philosophic, as well as military, 
rival. The members of the second group, Plato, Xenophon, 
and Aristophanes were supporters of aristocracy. Because 
Sparta was seen as the exemplar of aristocracy, aristocrats 
might be expected to look towards Sparta as an example of 
the aristocratic theory of government, and as such, as a 
philosophical ally. 
These two opposing camps each produced theories of 
their own to answer these questions. However, the fact that 
each of the authors had his own agenda mitigated the 
political prejudices that were, to some extent, behind the 
formation of these theories. This might skew the 
conclusions at which these figures arrive from what one 
might expect based upon a study of the general political 
preferences of their social class. 
Indeed,. agreement among the six people whose works on 
Sparta survived to the present day is remarkable, especially 
when they are studied under the supposition that they 
represented two antagonistic cliques with conflicting 
opinions concerning the polis. Despite the differences 
among them, all six of these writers seem to agree with 
Herodotus's old formula regarding Sparta. According to 
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him, "The Law" was the ruler of Sparta. 3 Fear enforced 
this Law, and it served to push the citizens to military 
excellence at all costs. 4 As a result, Sparta produced the 
most militarily successful people in Greece, as well as the 
most stable and long-lasting government that the Greeks 
would ever know. 5 It would also produce a population that 
was uniquely vulnerable to corruption by means of greed, 
imperialistic power-lust, and the luxuries of other states. 
Sparta became the unusual city that it was in a sudden 
revolutionary shift which did away with "the worst 
government in Greece." 6 The foundation of this new order 
was the Rhetra. Lykourgos established it with help from 
Apollo. 7 The primary motivations behind the development of 
the Rhetra were fear of the hoplites, fear of other poleis, 
and a need for regulation and moderation amongst the 
citizens.' By using agoge training to teach Sparta's 
leaders to lead well, its citizens to fight well, and its 
people to behave well, in complete accordance with the needs 
of the city, without taking into consideration their 
Herodotus, Historia, Book 7: Line 107. 
4 Ibid. 
s Ibid., Line 20. 
Herodotus, Historia, Book 1: Line 64. 
' Ibid., Line 66. 
1 Plato, Laws, Book 1: Segments 625d-626b; 
Thucydides, History, Book 5: Section 15, Line 14; Plutarch, 
Lykourgos, Section 5. 
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personal needs and desires, these forces were dealt with. 9 
The result was a citizen body that was perfectly trained to 
deal with the set of circumstances that Lykourgos foresaw as 
posing great danger to the stability of the state. However, 
the inculcation of such discipline in the citizens was 
required for the survival of any polis. 10 Why did the other 
poleis not emulate-this successful system? 
Thucydides has an explanation for why other cities did 
not imitate Sparta's culture. It was thoroughly unpleasant, 
and there were other, better ways that could apparently 
produce the same result. 11 That is one of the subjects 
discussed in Pericles's Funeral Oration. 12 The fact that, 
despite agoge training, Sparta was never really able to 
defeat Athens in the Peloponnesian Wars, supported this 
position. Sparta missed several opportunities to defeat its 
foe, and lost every segment of the war, except for the last 
one. Athens's defeat, at that time, was due more to its own 
drive for power, which led it to recommence the war 
needlessly and thereby alienate their allies, than it was to 
any victory of Sparta. 13 Given such a minimal return, why 
9 Plutarch, Agesilaus, Section 26-27; Xenophon, 
Constitution, Section 11, Line 15; Isocrates, Antidosis, 
Lines 297-300. 
1 0 Xenophon, Memorabilia, Book 4: Section 4, Line 16. 
1 1 Thucydides, History, Book 2: Line 39. 
12 Ibid. 
1 3 Thucydides, History, Book 6: Section 1. 
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go through the trouble of the agoge? 
Later historians chronicled how this corruption worked 
against Spartan discipline and excellence until even its 
incredible military power was lost. Aristophanes portrayed 
the individual citizens of Sparta, and Thucydides described 
Spartan discipline, military excellence, and fear in his 
work, much as Hero~otus did. 1 • Then, Thebes, the one time 
ally that Sparta had betrayed, conquered it. 15 Plato 
described and explained the flaws in its culture and 
government that caused it to degenerate so that it would 
fall. 16 Xenophon and Isocrates described the laws of Sparta 
with greater specificity. They also described the 
institutions that enforced these laws and chronicled their 
eventual failure. 17 
Disagreement on the basic facts of Sparta's history 
seems minimal. The points of disagreement among these 
figures exist in their interpretations and explanations of 
Sparta's fall. The democrats discussed the causes of 
Sparta's fall to a great extent. Herodotus showed how 
Sparta's overwhelming drive for military excellence left its 
citizens open to manipulation as a community, and vulnerable 
1 4 Ibid., Book 2: Section 11. 
1 5 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 4: Section 5, Line 23-52. 
1 6 Plato, Laws, Book 1: Segment 634a. 
17 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Lines 1-4; 
Section 1, Line 2; !socrates, Peace, Lines 94-98. 
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to corruption as individuals. Isocrates showed how this 
drive also fueled an imperialistic foreign policy but did 
not teach their leaders how to deal with an empire, thus 
leading to the empire's downfall. 1 ' Thucydides, like 
Herodotus, died before Sparta fell, but he too foresaw 
problems in the polis's future, and believed that the tragic 
flaw of the Spartan way was its obsession with fear. 1 ' He 
showed how this fear alienated Sparta's allies, and 
sometimes drove the polis to foolish actions. 20 The 
betrayal of Thebes by Sparta, which led to Sparta's fall, is 
foreseen in such depictions. 
The common denominator in the democratic criticisms of 
Sparta is that its tragic flaws were inherent in the Spartan 
system. Each of the writers studied had his own agenda, and 
thus one could not expect them to conform closely to any set 
of parameters, but, for the democrats, at least, there seems 
to be a very clear agreement on one idea. If this is true, 
then its fall may be seen as the final judgment of that 
system. Sparta could not have been saved because any 
attempted reform that could have saved Sparta would have 
required such a fundamental change in its system that 





Isocrates, Peace, Line 67. 
Thucydides, History, Book 1: Line 68-71; Line 88; 
Section 11; Book 3: Section 87; Book 4: Section 86. 
Ibid., Book 3: Line 89. 
recognizable as being from Lykourgan Sparta. Either its 
goal or the most basic means by which that goal might be 
assured would have had to be changed. 
The aristocrats were in a more awkward situation 
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regarding Sparta. First of all, as they were aristocrats, 
they were expected to defend Sparta, the exemplar of 
aristocracies. It is possible that a non-Spartan 
aristocracy could exist, and so a condemnation of Sparta 
might not require a condemnation of aristocracy. All that 
the aristocrats really lost when Sparta failed was an 
example to which they could refer. However, Sparta was 
still the champion and the symbol of all aristocracies in 
many classical minds. The implication was there. 
Secondly, Sparta proved itself to be a terrible tyrant 
when it came to power, and alienated everyone by the time of 
its fall, even its intellectual allies, Xenophon and Plato. 
How could these figures have supported Sparta if what it did 
disgusted them? Finally, Sparta fell. How could they 
support and praise such a spectacular failure? 
Xenophon resolved the difference between his hopes and 
Sparta's history by blaming the citizens of Sparta for the 
downfall of its perfect Lykourgan system, and then praising 
the system in his works. 21 However, this is a somewhat 
simplistic response. Lykourgos initiated his system to 
shape the people of Sparta. If they had failed, he had 
a 1 Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Lines 1-4. 
failed, and the system had failed. 
"solution" really solves nothing. 
Thus, Xenophon's 
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Plato admitted that he greatly disliked what became of 
Sparta, and placed the blame on its institutions. Then, he 
outlined the reforms that he would make in Sparta's system 
to avoid these flaws. However, the resulting Platonic 
Sparta would have bad little in common iith Lykourgos's 
Sparta. Plato would have altered its very goals. And so, 
one might conclude that though Plato was aristocratic in 
temperament, he opinions on Sparta were more similar to that 
of the democrats than to those of Xenophon, leaving Sparta 
with one less champion. 
Having written so little about the Spartans, 
Aristophanes represents no great aid to Xenophon in 
supporting Sparta. As has been said before, the playwright 
wrote about Sparta as a commentary on Athens, and not as the 
explanation of some private theory of political science. 
All that one really receives from him is the belief that 
Spartans were simple, unflappable rustics, whose common 
sense saw them through pretty much any problem. Given what 
eventually happened to them, this depiction of the Spartan 
seems incomplete at best. 
It seems as if, with the exception of Xenophon, who 
lived in Sparta when he wrote, none of the sources really 
deviated very much from the standard Athenian beliefs 
regarding Sparta. This might explain how these sources were 
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able to write about Sparta as they did. They might have 
been aristocrats but they were not traitors. 
There was never any real indication that any 
aristocrats' preference for Spartan political and social 
systems manifested itself in a desire to aid Sparta against 
Athens. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon described the 
Spartan sympathize~s as having a detrimental effect on the 
Athenian cause. Indeed, they both seem to think that it was 
the anarchistic, democratic element of Athens that ensured 
its defeat by causing it to fall under the sway of 
charismatic, but unworthy leaders, like Kleon. 22 
Furthermore, some modern historians suspect that Xenophon 
and Plato both served in the Athenian cavalry against 
Sparta, 23 while it is known that Aristophanes indicated 
through a representative character that he "hates Sparta as 
much as anyone," 24 even though he seemed to think the 
Spartans a more sensible people than the Athenians. So, 
there does not seem to be any reason to doubt that the 
aristocratic Athenians were loyal to their city. They 
simply disagreed with its system of government. 
Athens was very proud of its tradition of free speech 
and, having such, it allowed those aristocrats to pursue 
2 2 Thucydides, History, Book 3: Section 36, Line 6; 
Book 5: Section 59, Line 3. 
z 3 Ryle, 315; Anderson, Xenophon, 14, 18. 
2 4 Aristophanes, The Acharnians, Act 1: Lines 500-550. 
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their side of the dialogue regarding Sparta. This tolerance 
was probably easier to extend considering the theoretical 
nature of their praise for Sparta. Had the aristocrats 
threatened to force a Spartan system on Athens, they would 
have probably been eliminated immediately, as were the 
aristocratic Thirty who ruled Athens for a short time after 
the Peloponnesian War. 25 
So, the sum of this study of the six surviving authors 
shows that despite the different perspectives and approaches 
they took to their own city, they were actually fairly 
consistent in their depiction of Sparta. All seemed to 
respect the kosmos and harmonia toward which it strove, and 
all seemed to appreciate the extent to which these goals 
were achieved. However, all of these reviewers also 
appreciated the significance of the flaws that eventually 
led to Sparta's fall. In achieving complete control over a 
citizen's public life, Sparta rendered the Spartans as 
individuals exceptionally vulnerable to private vices. 
This paradox might help scholars to understand the end 
of the polis system in general. All poleis strove to 
achieve one way or the other the great degree of kosmos and 
harmonia that Sparta knew. If they did not do so, they 
could not survive through the Dark and Classical Ages of 
Greece, because survival was so difficult in those times 
25 Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 2: Section 3, Lines 11-
14; Line 24. 
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that the cooperation of the citizens with one another was 
vital. Inner discord left a polis unable to mount a defense 
against its enemies, and unlikely to cooperate in hard 
times. Because of the interdependence of allied soldiers in 
the hoplite phalanx, which was the standard military unit of 
the day, this need for cooperation between the citizen-
soldiers increased as time passed. But the very success of 
these tactics brought the poleis power, and thus a broader 
range and diversity of experience. These diverse 
experiences generated diverse ideas, and kosmos and harmonia 
became harder to maintain by traditional methods. 
Eventually the idea of cosmopolitanism was born, and with it 
came the openness of the Hellenistic Age, which many diverse 
cultures came to exist as subsidiaries of Hellenism without 
reducing the cities into a state of anarchy. 
culture survived. 
Thus, the 
There were those who feared this change, however. They 
did everything possible to avoid it, and the resulting 
failure of civilization and morality that they feared would 
be the inevitable product of cosmopolitan tolerance. For 
them, the fall of Sparta was a blow. Some, like Xenophon 
tried to deny the failure of kosmos, others, like Plato, 
tried to reform the ideas of kosmos and harmonia into forms 
by which they might survive the influences that toppled 
Sparta. However, none of these figures could divert the 
tide of history. Their attempt may be the one remaining 
trait which marks both of them as members of the 
conservative aristocratic class. 
Oskar Haeml, once wrote in Betrachtungen uber die 
menschliche Verlegenheit that: 
However bold, any achievement remains essentially 
an adaptation to reality; and the more excellent 
it is, the more it excludes other possibilities. 
But reality is ever-changing, not to be 
encompassed fn a merely finite system, so that at 
last each adaptation must fail. Thus we live with 
the tragic paradox that all organizations, be they 
biological species or human societies, are 
ultimately destroyed by their own virtues. 16 
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The sources reveal that Sparta was a perfect example of 
this principle. Lykourgos generated an incredibly efficient 
system that was perfectly adapted to deal with the problems 
Sparta faced in 708. There was little change either 
socially or economically, or in any other way, over the few 
centuries following Lykourgos's Reforms. Furthermore, 
change was inhibited within Sparta because it was cut off 
from the world geographically. 17 After the Reforms, it was 
also cut off socially. 11 When change did occur, the 
Spartans were indeed willing to adapt their system to some 
extent, in accordance with the needs of the time, as long as 
the basic ideals of the Reforms were never endangered. As a 
result, the Lykourgan Reforms persisted for four hundred 
26 Oskar Haeml, Betrachtungen uber die menschliche 
Verlegenheit, trans. Pol Anderson <New York: Penguin 
Books, 1972), 348. 
1 7 Forrest, History, 14-15. 
2 • Xenophon, Constitution, Section 14, Line 4. 
years. Change of a more fundamental and revolutionary 
nature was inevitable, however, and as per Haeml's dictum 
the more perfectly Sparta could deal with the original 
problems for which it was founded, the less it could deal 
with the disappearance of those problems. 
In that fact might be found the strength of the 
democratic system and the failure of the Spartan Reforms. 
The anarchistic democracies more closely resembled the 
unpredictable state of nature than the specialized, 
regulated conditions of Sparta. As a result, Athens was 
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more capable of adapting to any circumstances that occurred. 
The city, and its democratic principles exist today, but 
Classical Sparta and its culture do not. Sparta went the 
way of the saber-toothed tiger, which was magnificently 
equipped for one task, but only one. Athens was less 
efficient than Sparta because it needed to accommodate a 
relatively great number of sub-cultures, perspectives, and 
positions, but for that very reason it was more likely that 
Athens would contain citizens capable of properly dealing 
with any situation that might arise. The Athenians were 
general practitioners of the art of being a civilized 
people, while the Spartans were specialists in hoplite 
warfare and helot repression. 
However, moderns should not allow themselves to become 
smug about the survival of modernistic, democratic Athens in 
the face of the fall of backward, aristocratic Sparta. 
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Athens was simply better suited than Sparta to operating in 
the Hellenistic age that was coming into being at that time. 
Someday the situation could well be reversed. Democracy is 
a finite system, for all of its openness. In the fullness 
of time, society might come to require the regimentation and 
specialization of a Sparta if it is to survive. 
What will happen then, when some Dark Age forces man to 
fight for survival and stability in the midst of a great, 
hostile force which threatens him just as the helots 
threatened the Spartans of old? In all likelihood, the 
citizens of that future state will be unwilling to give up 
their freedoms. They will be as entrenched in their way of 
thinking as the Spartans were after four hundred years of 
the Lykourgan culture. They might refuse to give up their 
"rights," confident that some way out of their predicament 
will be found that will not require the sacrifice of what 
they know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to be their rights. 
That future culture might well fall, and thousands of years 
later leave a conundrum to those who follow. 
Such may be the fate of all civilizations. They fall 
due to a fundamental change in the relationship between the 
citizen and his environment to which that civilization 
cannot adapt, and, as a result, they leave mysteries behind 
to serve as their gravestones. Whatever these mysteries 
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concern, it is very possible that they are necessarily 
insoluble to the student of history, as these enigmas are 
inevitably the product of a world view that cannot exist in 
the student's culture or environment. 
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